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DEFECTIVENESS RESTATED:
EXPLODING THE "STRICT"
PRODUCTS LIABILITY MYTH
David G. Owen*
Strict liability in tort has occupied the core of modern prod-
ucts liability doctrine ever since Dean Prosser first penned the most
often cited Restatement section in history-section 402A of the
Second Restatement of Torts. In the Third Restatement, the ALl
has completely restructured the definition of product defectiveness.
The inscrutable phrase that has confounded courts and commenta-
tors for so many years- "defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous"-is now trifurcated according to the separate types of
product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and warn-
ings defects.
In this important article, Professor Owen explores the concep-
tual developments that led to the restated liability formulations and
provides much needed clarification of the "defectiveness" concept
for courts and practitioners alike. The Third Restatement's redefi-
nition of liability for manufacturing defects in terms of departure
from intended design restates the law in a manner that faithfully
reflects how courts have handled cases of this type. Yet the new
Restatement's definitions of defectiveness in design and warnings
cases are structurally awkward and unduly complex, a condition
which promises to continue the kind of confusion that has plagued
the application of section 402A in the courts. In order to clarify the
fundamental tests for design and warnings defects, the complicated
definitions of the Third Restatement are first decoded, in order to
reveal their essential concepts, and they are then reformulated into
simple and straightforward liability tests that courts and juries can
comprehend. In this manner, the Third Restatement's standards
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are translated into a useful form for resolving the central liability
issues in modern products liability litigation.
A reworking of the definitions of product defect requires an
exploration into the nature of "strict" liability in the various prod-
ucts liability contexts. While true strict liability has been adopted
for manufacturing defects, a reasonableness standard, which in-
cludes the notions of optimality and balance, in fact prevails in the
design and warning contexts. Professor Owen argues persuasively
that the reasonableness standard properly applied by courts in de-
sign and warnings cases is simply negligence, wrapped in a strict
liability shroud, and that courts might profitably dispense with the
myth that responsibility in these contexts is strict and embrace in-
stead both the language and doctrine of the negligence standard
they truly use.
It was 1964 when the American Law Institute propelled products
liability law into the modem age with the adoption of section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts.' With a gusto un-
matched in the annals of the Restatements of the Law,2 courts and
legislatures across the land embraced section 402A and the bold new
doctrine that it proclaimed-"strict" liability in tort for harm caused
by defective products. Tort law has probably never witnessed such a
rapid, widespread, and altogether explosive change in the rules and
theory of legal responsibility. 3 If ever a Restatement reformulation of
the law were accepted uncritically as divine,4 surely it is section 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts.5
1. All references to § 402A are to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1964).
2. At the June 8, 1993, meeting of the Consultative Group on the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, the Director of the ALI, Geoffrey Hazard, reported that § 402A has
been cited in judicial opinions more than any other section of any Restatement.
3. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 793-94 (1966) (characterizing the adoption of strict products liability in the
early 1960s as "the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the
entire history of the law of torts").
4. On the divinity of § 402A, see the remarks of Professor Aaron Twerski, co-Reporter
for the Third Restatement. Tort Reform-ALI to Begin Work on Restatement (Third); Profes-
sors Propose Revisions to Section 402A, 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 285, 286 (Mar. 13,
1992) (observing that § "402A has achieved the status of sacred scripture").
5. The basic doctrine of § 402A is examined in John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27
S.C. L. REV. 803 (1976), and John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Mtss. L.J. 825 (1973). The development and spread of the doctrine is chronicled in David G.
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980) [herein-
after Rethinking the Policies]; David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703 (1992) [herein-
after The Fault Pit]; George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA.
L. REV. 601 (1992). The moral foundations of the doctrine are explored in David G. Owen,
Products Liability Principles of Justice, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 238 (1991) [hereinafter Principles
of Justice]; David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (1993) [hereinafter Moral Foundations]. See generally
W. PAGE KEETON, DAVID G. OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY & MICHAEL D. GREEN, PRODUCTS
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Even from the start, of course, there were some heathens. A few
early commentators questioned the desirability and legitimacy of this
major change in tort law doctrine,6 and five states never did succumb
to the new religion.7 As time marched on into the 1970s and early
1980s, academic apostates grew in number,' and courts increasingly
questioned whether and how products liability law really should or
could be "strict." Then, beginning about the mid-1980s,9 the founda-
tions of the "strict" products liability cathedral began to fracture, re-
vealing large cracks in the doctrine's underlying theoretical
structure. 10 Today, while most courts still purport to apply a general
rule of "strict" liability in tort for defective products, and while some
academics still proclaim the virtues of such a rule," courts continue to
struggle to make sense out of section 402A in application and com-
mentators continue to expose its practical and theoretical problems.'
2
LIABILITY AND SAFETY-CASES AND MATERIALS 158-81 (2d ed. 1989) (chronicling the adoption
of § 402A).
6. See, e.g., O.E. Lange, Compensation of Victims-A Pious and Misleading Platitude, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1559 (1966); Richard E. Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Prod-
ucts Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804 (1965); Herbert W.
Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 713 (1970). Professor Plant saw the doctrine coming, and opposed it before it arrived.
Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-
An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957).
7. Jurisdictions that never adopted § 402A (or some other version of strict products liabil-
ity in tort) either judicially or legislatively include Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North
Carolina, and Virginia. The North Carolina General Assembly recently rejected the doctrine
legislatively. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (1995) ("There shall be no strict liability in tort in prod-
uct liability actions.").
8. See The Fault Pit, supra note 5, at 709 n.21 (collecting the articles).
9. Most notably in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984), followed most
significantly by Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988), and Anderson v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
10. See generally Principles of Justice, supra note 5; The Fault Pit, supra note 5; Moral
Foundations, supra note 5.
11. See, e.g., Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALl Product Liability Proposals: Progress or
Anachronism?, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1105 (1994); Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1265, 1275 (1994) ("For the American Law Institute to turn its back on strict products liability
now would be a singular mistake."); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liabil-
ity: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 695 (1995) ("[A] products [liability]
restatement should preserve the concept of strict liability ... [and] at least the framework of
Section 402A.").
12. At least in this nation. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctri-
nal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265
(1990); William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 639; Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819
(1992); see also supra note 8. On criticism in moral theory, see citations supra note 10.
England and the rest of the European Community still appear largely enamored of strict
products liability doctrine, and Japan recently adopted the European model. See generally GE-
RAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY (1993); JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIA-
BiLrry 185-217, 233-74 (1994); COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY (C.J. Miller ed., 1986);
Ferdinando Albanese & Louis F. Del Duca, Developments in European Products Liability, 5
DICK. J. INT'L L. 193 (1987); Peter De Val & R.J. Dormer, Developments in English Product
Liability Law: A Comparison with the American System, 62 TuL_ L. REV. 353 (1988); Japanese
Product Liability Bill Approved, Sent to Diet by Outgoing Prime Minister, 22 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) 425 (Apr. 22, 1994).
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In 1991, the American Law Institute determined that the time
had come for the products liability edifice to be reconstructed, 13 and
in 1992 it appointed Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski
as Reporters to perform the task.'4 Although some work remains to
be done in reformulating the secondary doctrine,'15 the Products Lia-
bility Restatement's most important portion-defining product "de-
fect"-has now been tentatively approved by the ALI.'6 The Gospel
According to Prosser, 17 as it were, has been rewritten.
How the basis of responsibility for product accidents is defined at
bottom is the most fundamental aspect of all of products liability law,
and the Third Restatement's definitional approach is problematical
and highly controversial.'" This article critically examines the basic
definitions of defect in sections 1 and 2 of the Products Liability Re-
statement.' 9 Together, these first two sections comprise the heart and
soul of the Third Restatement,20 and both are examined here against
the backdrop of the comments.2' Courts, practitioners, and commen-
13. See ALl to Begin Work on Restatement (Third); Professors Propose Revisions to Section
402A, 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 285 (Mar. 13, 1992); Restatement (Third) of Torts-
Law Institute Attendees Plan 5-Year Project; Members Agree on Core of Proposed Treatise, 20
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 493 (May 8, 1992).
14. Restatement (Third) of Torts-Prominent Law Professors Offered Positions as Co-Re-
porters on Product Liability Study, 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 547 (May 22, 1992). For
many years, both Henderson and Twerski had critically commented on much of the developing
§ 402A jurisprudence, and prior to their appointment as Reporters in 1992 they proposed a
revised restatement. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512 (1992).
15. Still to be tentatively approved, as this article goes to press in April 1996, are sections
on used products, causation, comparative fault, disclaimers, component part manufacturer liabil-
ity, successor liability, misrepresentation, and post-sale duties to warn or recall. See RESTATE-
MENT (THrRI) OF TORTS: PRODUCTs LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 3, Apr. 5, 1996).
16. Among other sections, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1-3
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995) were tentatively approved by the Institute at the annual
meeting of the ALI on May 18, 1995. As this article goes to press, Tentative Draft No. 3 has just
been issued. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABiLrY (Tentative Draft No. 3,
Apr. 5, 1996).
17. On the development of § 402A, for which Dean William Prosser was the Reporter, see
sources cited supra note 5.
18. See, e.g., ALI Approves Product Liability..., 63 U.S.L.W. 2734 (May 30, 1995). Even
the Director of the ALI, Geoffrey Hazard, notes the "inherently controversial" nature of defin-
ing design defectiveness. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY at xvi, xvii
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
19. Other aspects of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1, 2, 3,
10, 11, and 12 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995) are explored in David G. Owen, The Gray-
ing of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1241 (1994).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
Mar. 13, 1995), entitled "Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect,"
serves a limited but important default role for certain cases that fall between the defect defini-
tional cracks of § 2. See Owen, supra note 19, at 1248-50.
21. The Reporters' Notes, which provide a rich source of authority and analysis, are also
referred to infra as appropriate. Some commentators have challenged the reliability of certain
aspects of the Reporters' cited authority. See, e.g., Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor,
Restating the Restatement (Second), Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REV. 411, 415-20
(1993); Howard F. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the Consulta-
[Vol. 1996
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tators all will surely struggle to understand the new definitions of
product defect for many years to come, and the purpose of this article
is to facilitate that process. By exploring the tensions that lie beneath
the restated liability formulations, it seeks to clarify the central notion
of responsibility for product defects.
The analysis proceeds in several stages. First examined is the
Third Restatement's trifurcation of defectiveness into manufacturing
defects, design defects, and instruction and warning defects. Respon-
sibility for each is separately explored, and the newly formulated stan-
dards of liability for each is scrutinized. The Third Restatement's
definitions of defectiveness are then linguistically decoded to uncover
their core concepts. Standards of responsibility for design and warn-
ings defects are then reconstructed to clarify the central principles.
These reformulations are intended to provide courts and lawyers with
alternative approaches to defining design and warnings defects consis-
tent with the Restatement, yet in a manner which more clearly isolates
the issues that need to be decided. Finally examined is the Third Re-
statement's treatment of the most important secondary aspects of de-
fectiveness-obviousness, misuse, and state of the art-and how they
relate to the underlying concepts of product safety responsibility. As
one achieves a deeper, clearer vision of responsibility for product de-
fects, the myth of "strict" products liability explodes.
I. SETTING THE DEFINITIONAL STRUCTURE: TRIFURCATING
DEFECTIVENESS AND THE STANDARDS OF LIABILITY
Topic 1 of chapter 1 of the new Products Liability Restatement,
entitled "Product Defectiveness," describes the basic principles of
products liability in general and product defectiveness in particular.
Sections 1 and 2 set forth, in general terms, the standard of liability for
the sale of defective products and the separate formulations of the
"defect" concept. Section 3, adapted from the basic res ipsa loquitur
section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, prescribes a rule of cir-
cumstantial evidence for proof of defect in certain limited situations.22
The great bulk of fundamental products liability doctrine lies within
sections 1 and 2, which are the subjects of this article.
ive Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1173, 1173-76
(1994); Shapo, supra note 11, at 666-67; Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1407 (1994); John P. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute
Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the
States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 3 & cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995), entitled "Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product De-
fect" (drawing from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1964)), articulates a doctrine
that might be coined defect ipsa loquitur. This principle of products liability law, generally ap-
plied only in manufacturing defect cases, often is referred to as the "malfunction doctrine." See
generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY, & GREEN, supra note 5, at 53-57.
No. 3]
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Section 1 of the Third Restatement sets the basic liability
standard:
§ 1. Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by De-
fective Products
(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for
harm to persons or property caused by the product defect.
(b) A product is defective if, at the time of sale or distribution, it con-
tains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings.
2 3
In its very inception the Third Restatement bases all of products lia-
bility law on the concept of product "defect." Yet, rather than treat-
ing the defect concept as a single notion, as did the Second
Restatement in section 402A, the Third Restatement in section 1(b)
instead divides the concept into the three conventional categories of
defectiveness: (1) manufacturing defects, (2) defects in design, and
(3) defects in instructions and warnings. In an effort to focus on the
separate issues pertinent to these quite different forms of product dan-
ger, courts have uniformly employed this type of tripartite division of
the concept of product defect.24 In this structural respect, therefore,
section 1 fairly restates the broad categories of products liability law
accepted by the courts.
The significance of section 1, however, lies not in the fact of tri-
furcating defectiveness, but in what it does with the trifurcation. By
splintering the defect notion from a unitary concept into three, section
1 provides a mechanism for stripping away the great bulk of strict lia-
bility from products liability law and returning it to negligence, more
or less. More specifically, by pulling design and warnings cases away
from those involving manufacturing defects, section 1 permits the re-
tention of strict liability in the latter context, where almost all agree
that it belongs,25 while abandoning the strict liability concept for negli-
gence principles in design and warning cases 26 which comprise the
bulk of products liability law and litigation.27
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
Mar. 13, 1995).
24. On the conventional nature of this classification, see id. § 1 cmt. a, reporters' note.
25. Even George Priest, long a vocal opponent to the principles of § 402A, has come
around to this position. See George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2316-17 (1989); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 624 (making this
observation).
26. Section 1 cmt. a states:
[T]he [strict liability] rule developed for manufacturing defects is inappropriate for [design
and warnings cases]. The latter categories of cases require determinations that the product
could have reasonably been made safer by a better design or instruction or warning....
[The definitions of defect in these cases] rely on a reasonableness test traditionally used in
determining whether an actor has been negligent.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995).
27. Design and warnings claims together were found to comprise 60% of all claims in one
study, and 71% in another. In a study of large claims (in excess of $100,000) in which strict
[Vol. 1996
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Shifting from strict liability to negligence principles in the new
Restatement does in a broad way "restate" what courts have long
been doing if rarely saying. It has been an open secret for many years
that courts have been purporting to apply "strict" liability doctrine to
design and warnings cases while in fact applying principles that look
remarkably like negligence.28 Quite simply, most courts have been
saying one thing while doing quite another-calling a pig a mule.29
The courts may be excused for this blatant mislabeling because they
were misguided on this point by section 402A, which has been justifia-
bly criticized for "restating" the law of 1964 as the Reporter (Dean
William Prosser) then surmised it might evolve by the year 2010-as
"strict.1 30 Indeed, it was section 402A's premature definition of prod-
uct defectiveness as a unitary concept, subject to a single principle of
strict liability, that has led in large part to the current "law" that calls a
pig a mule.
The Reporters and the ALI fairly might be faulted for not right-
ing the "wrong" of section 402A-for failing to restate in black letter
the basis of liability for design and warnings errors explicitly as "negli-
gence. t3 1  Indeed, shortly before the Third Restatement project, the
Reporters themselves forthrightly proclaimed that this type of termi-
nological confusion "inevitably [breeds] bad law."32 Moreover, their
explanation in the comments for applying negligence principles to de-
liability was the main theory of liability, defective design was the theory in 75% of the claims,
and warning defectiveness was the theory in 18%. KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN,
supra note 5, at 22-24.
28. See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence
[to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980); Mary J. Davis,
Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217,
1238-48 (1993); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 12, at 277-78; Powers, supra note 12; Keith
Miller, Design Defect Litigation in Iowa: The Myths of Strict Liability, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 465
(1991); Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The
Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183 (1992). This divergence between illusory strict
liability doctrine and actual liability principles is diagrammatically illustrated in The Fault Pit,
supra note 5, at 706.
29. See David G. Owen, Musings on Modern Products Liability Law: A Foreword, 17 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 505,511 (1987) (noting the resulting "confusion and embarrassment of calling
a pig a mule").
30. Dean Prosser could point in fact to only one tort law case, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), to support the principle of strict products liability in tort,
and he predicted that the principle might become the law in 50 years. William L. Prosser, The
Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120-21 (1960).
For criticism of predicating § 402A on such a slender reed, see Priest, supra note 25, at 2316-17.
31. For a sampling of the many commentaries on the theoretical and practical problems
with basing products liability law on such a. fundamental disingenuity, see sources cited supra
note 6.
32. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 12, at 278. "[P]eople tend to give real meaning to
differences in terminology; they forget that word games are being played. Thus, although mixing
negligence and strict liability concepts is often a game of semantics, the game has more than
semantic impact-it breeds confusion and, inevitably, bad law." Id. Their stark reversal on this
important point is curious.
No. 31
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sign and warnings cases33 is far more powerful than their unpersuasive
apology for the "rhetorical preference" of many courts for calling de-
sign and warnings liability standards "strict. '34
Several arguments may be marshalled to support the hybrid ap-
proach chosen by the Reporters and approved by the Institute. First,
because many courts now do in fact call a pig a mule, that incongruity
may be viewed as "law," and so it arguably may be so restated.35 Sec-
ond, the definition is improved somewhat, in that a pig is defined no
longer merely as a "mule," but now is defined instead as a "pig-like
mule." That is, while liability is "strictly" defined in design and warn-
ings "defect" terms, the defect concept is itself explained (albeit in the
comments) in terms of "a reasonableness test traditionally used in de-
termining whether an actor has been negligent. '36 Third, the Report-
ers are now essentially correct in asserting that "products liability is a
discrete area of tort law which borrows piecemeal from negligence
and warranty [and which] is not fully congruent with classical tort or
contract law."' 37 It arguably follows, therefore, that liability may ra-
tionally be defined, as the Reporters have done, as a combination of
the strict liability terms of contract law and the reasonableness-balanc-
ing principles of the law of negligence. Lost in the process, however,
is the long-established divide between tort and contract. Also lost is
the vital commonsense distinction between negligence, based on fault,
and no-fault liability that is "strict."
As do the courts (in both word and deed), the new Restatement
defines the standard of liability for manufacturing defects in the strict
liability terms of the law of contract.38 Because of the special signifi-
cance in the manufacturing flaw context of the user's expectation in-
terests,39 contract law's strict liability principle here is plainly proper.
By contrast, the new Restatement, like most courts in fact (but not in
word), explains liability for design4" and warnings41 defects in the rea-
sonableness-balancing-negligence terms of the law of tort. Consumer
expectations remain entitled to important respect in this context, too,
but they are demoted as a strict test of liability and relegated in the
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
34. Id. § 1 cmt. a.
35. Arguably it should not. See infra notes 68, 92-104 and accompanying text.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995); see also id. § 2 cmts. a, c, d & f. Section 8, concerning the liability of sellers
of prescription drugs and medical devices, similarly applies negligence principles to design and
warnings liability by rules tailored to that specific context. Id. § 8.
37. Id. § 1 cmt. a.
38. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
39. See generally Owen, supra note 19, at 1245; Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 467-68
("[T]he expectations of the parties, and ultimately the truth, support the maker's responsibility
for harm from latent manufacturing defects.").
40. See infra notes 53-89 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 90-110 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1996
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new Restatement to the balancing calculus.42 In sum, by grounding
liability generally in strict terms of "defect," and by explaining design
and warnings defects in hybrid form, section 1 places products liability
law squarely in the borderland between tort and contract, between
negligence and strict liability, where it straddles both domains.
Section 2 of the Third Products Liability Restatement particular-
izes the defectiveness liability standard as follows:
§ 2. Categories of Product Defect
For purposes of determining liability under § 1:
(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
parts from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in
the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of
a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a prede-
cessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alter-
native design renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warn-
ings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commer-
cial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings
renders the product not reasonably safe.43
Erected upon the structure and premises of section 1, section 2
provides a separate definition of liability for each of the three tradi-
tional types of product defectiveness-manufacturing flaws, excessive
design dangers, and informational inadequacies in warnings and in-
structions. In a nutshell, a strict liability test for manufacturing defects
is established in section 2(a), and tests for design and warnings defects
that are strictly framed but really based on principles of negligence are
established in sections 2(b) and (c). This is only the basic shell of sec-
tion 2, however, and the specific contours of each of the three stan-
dards are now examined separately in turn.
II. PRODUCTION FLAWS: DEFECTS IN MANUFACTURE
In no uncertain terms, section 2(a) proclaims liability for manu-
facturing defects to be strict-based on a test of "departure from in-
tended design." If there were otherwise any doubt as to the strictness
of this liability test," it is altogether put to rest by the standard's final
qualifier, which emphasizes that liability will attach "even though all
42. Ibis point is principally applicable to design cases. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
ToRTs: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995). Although it
applies somewhat to warnings cases, such cases are by their nature more fundamentally based on
the frustration of expectations. Nevertheless, for a variety of good reasons, negligence principles
properly govern warnings cases, too. See Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 465-67.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
Mar. 13, 1995).
44. There should not be, because the comments describe the black letter liability standard
as "strict." Id. § 2 cmt. a.
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possible care was exercised" by the seller.45 The notion of deviation
from design specifications (variation from blueprints) has long been
widely accepted as the proper standard of responsibility for product
accidents attributable to manufacturing flaws.46 Even when the basis
of liability is negligence rather than strict liability, courts for many
years have allowed recovery in manufacturing defect cases without re-
quiring specific proof as to how the manufacturing error occurred, and
even lacking specific evidence on how the accident occurred.47 While
proof-problem cases of this type are now specifically addressed under
the separate "malfunction" umbrella of section 3 of the Third Restate-
ment,48 the long-standing willingness of courts liberally to allow an
inference of negligence upon a simple finding of manufacturing defect
demonstrates the established judicial view that liability for such de-
fects should indeed be strict.
There are many good reasons why the courts have been so ready
to allow liability once a manufacturing defect is found to have caused
an accident. First, in practical terms, such errors in production are apt
to be few and far between, so that liability in such cases is unlikely to
threaten a manufacturer with financial ruin. Moreover, the availabil-
ity of blueprints to use as a standard of quality usually provides a clear
touchstone of responsibility: the manufacturer will seek to conform
(within allowable tolerances) all units of its product to the standards
specified by its engineers or scientists, and the particular accident-pro-
ducing unit can be measured against those standards. Indeed, manu-
facturers ordinarily do not even try to deny that deviations from their
own design specifications (in excess of accepted tolerances) are in fact
usually attributable to some form of negligent mistake. 49 At a more
fundamental level, consumer expectations are likely to be severely
and unfairly fractured by violent product failures caused by manufac-
turing defects °5 and principles of truth and equality demand that sell-
ers be strictly accountable to consumers injured by such defects. 1
Section 2(a), therefore, is consistent with how courts treat manu-
facturing cases52 and with moral theory. While most courts have gen-
45. The "even though all possible care" qualifier is borrowed from RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (1964) ("although ... the seller has exercised all possible care").
46. During the many heated congressional committee debates of the 1980s over bills that
broadly recodified products liability law, formulations of the liability standard for manufacturing
defects along these lines were generally accepted uncritically and noncontroversially.
47. See, e.g., Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 922 (1972).
48. See supra notes 20, 22 and accompanying text.
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 624.
50. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
51. Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 467-68, 473-74.
52. See, e.g., Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 204 (Mont. 1986) (approving defi-
nition of manufacturing defect as nonconformance with design).
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erally assumed the "departure from intended design" standard
without explicitly articulating it, there is little doubt that it well de-
scribes what courts in such cases have been thinking and what they
properly have been doing. Accordingly, courts should be expected to
endorse quite willingly the strict liability test for manufacturing de-
fects in section 2(a) of the Third Restatement.
III. CONCEPTUAL MISJUDGMENTS: DEFECTS IN DESIGN
Determining the proper basis of liability for dangers in design has
proven to be the most vexing problem in the entire field of products
liability law. Apart from the fundamentally perplexing issue of
whether "strict" liability makes sense at all for dangers in design,
5 3
courts and practitioners54 have been confounded by a bewildering ar-
ray of conceptual problems from the time design defect litigation first
charged boldly onto the judicial scene in the 1960s. For thirty years,
debate has raged over such important issues as the proper "tests" of
liability, including the problem of finding a proper role for consumer
expectations, and the definition of proper limits for the outer bounda-
ries of responsibility based on such factors as the obviousness of the
danger, the misuse of a product by the victim or another, and the sig-
nificance of the state of the technological art. Thus, any effort to re-
state or redesign the law of liability for product design was destined to
be the most daunting task in the entire Products Liability Restatement
project.
The quite transparent objective of section 2(b) is to adopt a negli-
gence standard of liability clothed in the "defect" language of strict
liability-to dress a pig in mule's clothing, as mentioned earlier. Put-
ting aside for now the desirability of such an approach, it should be
helpful to look at how section 2(b) might look if instead it were
drafted explicitly in negligence terms. Such a forthright liability defi-
nition might look something like the following:
A manufacturer is subject to liability for harm caused by a product if a
reasonable manufacturer would have designed the product more safely, that
is, if the manufacturer was negligent in failing to adopt a safer design.
Understanding why a general negligence approach to liability for de-
sign danger (in either a pure pig-is-a-pig form or the Restatement's
pig-is-a-mule formulation) is preferable to strict liability requires ex-
amining the distinction between optimal and absolute safety that lies
at the heart of the concept of reasonable behavior.
53. For a persuasive argument that it does not, see, for example, Moral Foundations, supra
note 5, at 466-84; Powers, supra note 12, at 640.
54. To say nothing of the commentators; the articles are too numerous to cite.
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A. Optimal vs. Absolute Safety
Consumer advocates, plaintiffs' lawyers, and persons untutored in
law, economics, or utility theory often argue that products should be
"safe." Alluring at first glance, such a statement of the goal contains a
deceptive defect: it assumes that the "safety" concept is absolute, that
a product is either "safe" or "unsafe," and that absolute or perfect
safety is both technologically feasible and normatively desirable. As
general propositions, such premises are seriously misguided, and they
produce much mischief and confusion.55 When safety is properly con-
ceived of in a priori terms, as a prediction of the avoidance of future
injury from some condition, it is necessarily a matter of probability
and, hence, degree.56 As is undeniably true of all predictions of how
the future will unfold, the very notion of the "safety" of a particular
product design is inherently uncertain and contingent, highly depen-
dent upon the degree to which the product is used for the purposes
and in the manner planned for and reasonably expectable by the de-
sign engineers. Safety is the opposite side of risk (or danger), which is
also an a priori concept that is probabilistically contingent rather than
absolute.
Because "strict" liability implies that any degree of risk is simply
wrong, it is intrinsically deficient as a true standard for design liabil-
ity.57 Instead, since the degree of risk or safety in every product de-
sign is counterbalanced by considerations such as cost, utility, and
aesthetics, the basis of responsibility for design choices logically
should be based on the principle of optimality inherent in the philo-
sophical notion of utility and in the economic concept of efficiency.
That is, the goal of both design engineers and the law should be to
promote in products an ideal balance of product usefulness, cost, and
safety.
58
This is why negligence is the ideal standard for product design
responsibility.5 9 From the start, the concept of negligence has been
55. See generally Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278 (1985); David G. Owen, Philosophical
Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G.
Owen ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995); Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Lia-
bility, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 147 (1988); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against
Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 495 (1985).
56. Safety is usually absolute, of course, as to a particular person's experience on a particu-
lar, past occasion: a person either will have experienced the occasion safely (without injury) or
not.
57. As it is for liability more generally. See, e.g., The Fault Pit, supra note 5, at 705 (opin-
ing that tort law is properly returning to a fault-based ethic from strict liability); Perry, supra
note 55 (arguing that there is no "plausible justification ... for a general standard of strict
liability in tort.").
58. See generally Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 477-84.
59. Cf. Davis, supra note 28, at 1248-50 (noting that courts "recognize the true nature of
the design defect inquiry: Did the manufacturer exercise the required care in its design decisions
to prevent foreseeable risks of unreasonable harm to the plaintiff?" and proposing to heighten
the standard of care to reflect the manufacturer's position of trust).
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based on the notion of "reasonableness," predicated on the idea that
proper decisions involve selecting the proper balance of expected ad-
vantages and disadvantages, of expected benefits and coStS. 60 Learned
Hand, of course, memorialized the essence of this concept in his cele-
brated B < PL -> N negligence formula in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.61 This type of "cost-benefit" or "risk-utility" analysis may
be problematic if relied upon excessively as a mechanical device for
producing automatic "right" answers, but it nicely describes the deci-
sional calculus that lies at the heart of products liability law in particu-
lar and accident law in general.62
In sum, the interrelated concepts of reasonableness, optimality,
and balance on which design decisions necessarily rest are captured
flawlessly by the flexible negligence concept. By contrast, "strict" lia-
bility is a rigid absolutist concept premised on an inherent priority of
right-a concept which is entirely misplaced in evaluating the propri-
ety of design judgments that necessarily involve tradeoffs among con-
flicting interests of different groups of persons. Thus, the Third
Restatement correctly endorses the widespread judicial practice of ap-
plying negligence principles (albeit in "strict" liability clothing) as the
basis of liability for dangers in product design.63
B. The Design of Section 2(b)-Reasonable or Defective?
Section 2(b), of course, is defined in terms of "defectiveness"
rather than explicitly in the language of negligence. The first issue
here, then, concerns the section's rationale for employing a standard
of liability that purports to be "strict" but which is based on the negli-
gence principles of reasonableness, optimality, and balance. The sec-
ond, more technical, issue concerns the effectiveness of the section's
structure and language in achieving this objective.
The definition in this subsection provides that a design is "defec-
tive" if the "foreseeable risks" of the product "could have been re-
duced or avoided by . . . a reasonable alternative design ... and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe."'  If the purpose of this language were to adopt the doctrine of
negligence, then it would indeed be a poor substitute for a standard
60. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 88-103 (1881);
Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40-42 (1915).
61. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (expressing the concept in algebraic terms, as negli-
gence being implied if B < PL, where B is the burden or cost of avoiding accidental loss, P is the
increase in probability of loss if B is not undertaken, and L is the probable magnitude or cost of
such loss).
62. KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 59-60. The Hand formula
is supported in moral theory by the principle of equality. See The Fault Pit, supra note 5, at 722.
63. On the judicial practice in this respect, see, for example, Birnbaum, supra note 28, at
600-10; Davis, supra note 28, at 1248-71.
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCrs LIABILITY § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
Mar. 13, 1995).
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that based liability simply upon whether the seller was negligent in
failing to adopt a safer design-the pig-is-a-pig definition of negligent
design set forth above. Yet the Reporters chose to adopt not the doc-
trine but the utilitarian principles of negligence-reasonableness, op-
timality, and balance-within a broader framework that is "strict."
That is, section 2(b) quite plainly attempts to straddle products liabil-
ity doctrine between the traditional doctrines of both negligence and
strict liability.
This type of structural straddling between conventional common-
law doctrines is problematic, but it does reflect the dual origin and
nature of products liability law. Tort law is centrally implicated since
the domain involves responsibility for creating risks of injury to other
persons; yet contract law principles may help define the allocation of
risks arising out of sales transactions in which monetary value is vol-
untarily exchanged for property containing both utility and risk.65 As
products liability law has evolved, it truly is neither exclusively tort
nor contract, but a discrete area of law in between, as the Reporters
correctly note,' that lies within the borderland of "tortracts. ' '67 Dean
Prosser's immortal words, penned prior to the birth of section 402A,
reemerge from the mists of time: "When the ghosts of case and as-
sumpsit walk hand in hand at midnight, it is sometimes a convenient
and comforting thing to have a borderland in which they may lose
themselves." 68
Thus, in section 2(b), the utilitarian, fault-based negligence prin-
ciples of tort law and the expectational, strict liability principles of the
law of contracts are conjoined.69 Whether this conjunction is proper
may well be doubted, for the separate spheres of tort and contract law
serve distinct functions and derive from disparate policies and ethics.7 °
But the theoretical propriety of joining tort and contract principles in
the borderland realm of products liability law involves a morass of
deep and complex issues that exceed the boundaries of this article. It
is sufficient here to understand the rationale for section 2(b)'s blended
65. The typical products liability paradigm thus is far more complex than the ordinary tort
paradigm of A hits B. See Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 461-62.
66. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrry § 1 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
67. For more than one sufficient reason, "tortracts" is a better term than "contorts" to
describe the general borderland between the law of torts and the law of contracts. First, the
"tortracts" term avoids the ambiguity of appearing to describe the area of constitutional torts, as
"contorts" appears to do. Second, it gives primacy to the dominant and more valuable field of
law. Finally, "tortracts" is simply the more elegant word. In the particular case of products
liability law, there is an additional reason for preferring "tortracts," to wit, the accepted fact that
tort law principles properly dominate the analysis of the great majority of products liability is-
sues. See id. § 1 cmt. a.
68. William L. Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED ToPiCS ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 380, 452 (1953).
69. Although strict liability may be the prevailing rule of contract law, it is hardly a stran-
ger to the law of torts.
70. See authorities cited supra note 6.
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approach to defining product defect and to observe the problematic
nature of this conjunctive enterprise.
The structure and language of the section may be examined next
to see if the goal-of infusing negligence principles into a strictly
stated liability rule-is essentially achieved.7' The first question here
is whether the design liability rule stated in section 2(b) is indeed
facially strict. The answer must be that it largely is. If strict liability is
properly defined as "liability without fault," then section 2(b) on its
face adopts a strict liability rule. Liability rests upon the notion of
"defectiveness," which describes the condition of the product, not the
conduct of the seller. An accident product is deemed defective in de-
sign if it was more dangerous than it reasonably needed to be, as
demonstrated by the existence at the time of a reasonable safer de-
sign, which renders the accident product by comparison "not reason-
ably safe." At the surface, liability is predicated entirely on the
product-not the seller-being bad. Thus, on the face of the black
letter, liability for defective design is "strict."
If liability accordingly is strict, how then can it be based on the
fault-based principles of negligence? For an answer to this apparent
paradox, one must examine the comments to sections 1 and 2, as well
as the black letter, which together make it abundantly clear that the
notions of "defective design" and "not reasonably safe" rest almost
entirely, perhaps completely, on principles of negligence. On closer
analysis of the black letter rule itself, the defect-based "strict" liability
of section 2(b) appears to be altogether congruent with liability in
negligence. By hypothesis, a manufacturer would be blameworthy for
choosing to sell a defectively designed, not reasonably safe product
containing foreseeable risks that reasonably could have (and hence
"should have") been avoided had the manufacturer adopted a reason-
able alternative design. Such a manufacturer thus would necessarily
appear to be negligent for making and selling a product that it should
have known to be excessively dangerous-more dangerous than a
prudent manufacturer should have known it reasonably needed to be.
As noted earlier, negligence law is predicated on certain funda-
mental principles rooted in utilitarian theory-reasonableness, op-
timality, and balance-each of which in fact implies the others.
Design liability, as defined in section 2(b), is constructed squarely on
these three principles. The black letter language of the section itself is
structured around the principle of reasonableness: to be defective, the
product must be "not reasonably safe"; for a product to be character-
ized as "not reasonably safe," the manufacturer must have failed to
71. I put aside for now the linguistic problems of interpretation that are examined infra
part V.
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adopt a "reasonable alternative design. '72 Comment c notes that this
standard for judging defectiveness of design is "a reasonableness
('risk-utility' balancing) test" viewed from the perspective of "a rea-
sonable person... used in administering the traditional reasonable-
ness standard in negligence." Thus, the negligence principle of
reasonableness lies at the heart of the design defect standard of
liability.
By equating reasonableness with the second principle, " 'risk-util-
ity' balancing," comment c taps into the analytical process Learned
Hand explicitly applied in Carroll Towing to judge the reasonableness
of behavior under negligence law, as noted earlier.73 In determining
whether the safety of a product's design should be increased further,
in searching for the point of optimality, a reasonable design engineer
must balance the costs and benefits (the risks and utility) of adding
increased safety. Balancing assessments are necessary because manu-
facturers are forced to shoulder a legislative-type responsibility74 in
accommodating the often-confficting interests of three quite different
constituencies: (1) consumers generally, who desire an optimal bal-
ance between usefulness, cost, and safety; (2) future injury victims,
who retrospectively desire absolute safety;75 and (3) shareholders,
who desire safety levels that will generate the highest profit. 76 A rea-
sonable manufacturer must accord equal respect to all such persons by
72. For a consideration of this interpretation of § 2(b), see infra notes 124-25 and accompa-
nying text.
73. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. More fully, cmt. c provides in pertinent
part as follows:
Subsection (b) adopts a reasonableness ("risk-utility" balancing) test as the standard for
judging the defectiveness of product designs. More specifically, the test is whether a reason-
able alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative design ren-
dered the product not reasonably safe.
RESTATEMENT (TmD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTs Ltafiu-ry § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995). Comment c also explains the connection between balancing and reasonableness:
Assessment of a product design requires a comparison between an alternative design
and the product design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reason-
able person. That standard is also used in administering the traditional reasonableness stan-
dard in negligence. See Restatement, Second, of Torts, § 283, Comment c. The policy
reasons that support use of a reasonable person perspective in connection with the general
negligence standard also support its use in the products liability context.
Id.
74. Cf James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534, 1538 (1973) (characterizing
such decisions by manufacturers as "polycentric" and "managerial"). See generally Moral Foun-
dations, supra note 5, at 468-84 (examining the manufacturer's "legislative" task).
75. The future injury victim group may be subdivided even further, according to types of
product risk; reducing one type of risk for one class of person may increase a different type of
risk for others. See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
959 (1981) (installing steel frame on side of car, safer in side-impact collisions, would render the
car more dangerous in the more frequent type of front- and rear-impact collisions); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13,
1995).
76. Section 2 comment a explains why a reasonable manufacturer must make such balanc-
ing assessments:
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"legislating" levels of safety (and utility and cost) that optimally bal-
ance the competing interests of all concerned. 7
In the quest for optimal safety, 78 a manufacturer must appropri-
ately consider the interests of each of its three constituencies by fairly
balancing a large variety of design considerations that often conflict
with one another: the foreseeable risks of harm, consumer expecta-
tions, usefulness, cost, longevity, responsibility for maintenance, aes-
thetics, marketability, and other advantages and disadvantages of the
chosen and omitted safety features.79 After a product accident, the
judge and jury must evaluate these same factors with respect to both
the accident product as designed and the alternative put forward by
the plaintiff. A product's design will be deemed "not reasonably safe"
and hence "defective" if a comparison of the designs of the two prod-
ucts-the accident product and the alternative product proposed by
Some sort of independent assessment of relevant advantages and disadvantages, to which
some attach the label "risk-utility balancing," is necessary. Products are not generically
defective merely because they are dangerous. Many risks can be eliminated only by exces-
sively sacrificing product features that make the products useful and desirable. For such
risks, users and consumers are the best risk minimizers. Thus, trade-offs are necessary to
determine which risks are more fairly and efficiently borne by the immediate user, on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, by users and consumers generally, through the mecha-
nism of holding product sellers liable and having product prices reflect the relevant
costs.... [T]he advantages and disadvantages of existing designs and safer alternatives must
be considered in determining whether a defendant's design is defective.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995) (emphasis added).
77. Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 468-84.
78. The Reporters discuss the important optimality concept in § 2 cmt. a. See supra note
73. The point is developed further in that comment:
Subsections (b) and (c) of § 2. which impose liability for products that are defectively
designed or sold without adequate warnings or instructions and are thus not reasonably
Safe, achieve the same general objectives as does liability predicated on negligence. The
emphasis is on creating incentives formanufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in
designing and marketing products. Society does not benefit from products that are exces-
sively safe-for example, automobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20 miles per
hour-any more than it benefits from products that are too risky. Society benefits most
when the right, or optimal, amount of product safety is achieved. From a fairness perspec-
tive, requiring individual users and consumers to bear appropriate responsibility for proper
product use prevents careless users and consumers from being subsidized by more careful
users and consumers, when the former are paid damages out of funds to which the latter are
forced to contribute through higher product prices.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995). This subsection provides in pertinent part as follows:
e. Design defects. factors relevant in determining whether the omission of a reasonable
alternative renders a product not reasonably safe. Subsection 2(b) states that a product is
defective in design if the omission of a reasonable alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe. A broad range of factors may legitimately be considered in determining
whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not
reasonably safe. The factors include, among others, the magnitude of the foreseeable risks
of harm, the instructions and warnings that accompanied the product, the nature and
strength of consumer expectations regarding the product, the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of the product as designed and as it alternatively could have been designed, and
the effects of the alternative design on production costs, product longevity, maintenance and
repair, esthetics, and marketability.
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the plaintiff-demonstrates that the alternative product's balance of
cost and benefit factors was better than the accident product's balance
of these same factors.8° And the converse is also true: if the balance
of competing design considerations in the accident product was as
good or better than the balance in the plaintiff's alternative design,
then the accident product's design will be deemed "reasonably safe"
and "nondefective."
81
Section 2(b) rests on negligence principles by limiting the consid-
eration of risks (and presumably benefits) to those that are foresee-
able. The black letter rule itself speaks expressly in terms of
"foreseeable risks of harm," and the comments note that "the balanc-
ing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must
be done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance tech-
niques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution."'  This re-
striction of consideration to risks that are foreseeable is ordinarily of
greater importance in warning defect cases than in cases involving
dangers in design, and it is fully considered in that context below.83 It
is sufficient here to note that restricting a seller's design responsibili-
ties to risks that are foreseeable precludes resort to the truly strict
"Wade-Keeton test" of defectiveness employed in a number of juris-
dictions,' which leaves the consumer expectations liability test as the
only way to define liability for design defectiveness in a manner that is
strict.
80. The plaintiff, of course, must also prove causation-that the alternative product would
have prevented or reduced his harm. See id. §§ 1(a), 2 cmts. d, m & p. Causation is treated
generally in id. §§ 10 & 11. A "better balance" definition of defective design is proposed below,
infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
81. Implicit in finding such a product "innocent" is the conclusion that its risks of injury fall
fairly on users (potential victims) rather than on the manufacturer:
[PIroduct makers [should] be legally responsible for the harmful consequences of their neg-
ligent mistakes, but not for "proper" legislative choices that the manufacturer could only do
its best to make and price for the general benefit of the community as a whole. Principles of
freedom, truth, equality, utility, and efficiency all support a principle that places on potential
victims the risk of harmful consequences that inevitably flow from reasonable efforts of
manufacturers to protect the public good.
Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 504 (citations omitted).
82. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995). The soundness of this approach is explained in terms of moral theory in
Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 483-84.
83. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
84. The so-called Wade-Keeton test of strict products liability in tort imputes knowledge of
all risks, knowable and unknowable alike, to the manufacturer and then bases liability on
whether a manufacturer with such knowledge would be negligent in marketing the product in the
condition in which it was sold. Because this test predicates liability on fictional "constructive"
knowledge that may be impossible for the manufacturer to possess, liability is truly "strict." The
Wade-Keeton test has now been repudiated by both Deans Wade and Keeton, and is rejected by
the Reporters. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) & cmts. a & 1
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995). For a good discussion of this matter, see id. § 2 cmt. 1.
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Yet the Third Restatement conclusively and controversially85 ex-
pels consumer expectations from the definitional contest" as an in-
dependent test of defect in products liability cases. Instead, consumer
expectations are relegated in the comments to mere factor status, for
consideration among the various other factors that comprise the risk-
utility calculus.87 The consumer expectations test derives from the law
of contracts,88 and, like the great bulk of contract law principles, it
operates in a manner that is truly "strict." Thus, this test often oper-
ates poorly in the design context where reasonableness, optimality,
and balance are the proper benchmarks of responsibility. By ban-
ishing consumer expectations as a formal test of product defect, the
Reporters89 exploded the final obstacle to the complete and final vic-
tory of negligence principles in shaping the defect concept in design
and warnings cases.
In sum, while defining design danger liability in terms that appear
"strict," section 2(b) is constructed upon principles of reasonableness,
optimality, and balance that are the hallmarks of the law of negli-
gence. The one workable way of viewing risk-benefit analysis as a
form of strict liability, by expelling the foreseeability limitation from
the calculus, is rejected in both the black letter and the comments.
Finally, the comments explicitly reject the use of consumer expecta-
tions as a strict liability test for design liability, relegating such expec-
tations to the balancing calculus for consideration among the other
variables. What remains quite clearly is a design liability rule that
may be strict in name, and is perhaps somewhat strict in superficial
focus, but which is grounded in and determinable upon fault-based
principles of negligence.
IV. INFORMATIONAL INADEQUACIES: DEFECTS IN WARNINGS
AND INSTRUCTIONS
Warnings and instructions are complementary to a product's de-
sign, but they are otherwise quite different concepts. The design of a
85. See, e.g., Klemme, supra note 21; Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations
in Product Strict Liability Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TE, N. L. REV. 1189
(1994); Phillips, supra note 11; Shapo, supra note 11. Contra Owen, supra note 19.
86. For an overview of the consumer expectations v. risk-utility contest, see KEETON,
OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 189-244.
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995); supra note 79. The demotion of consumer expectations is pro-
claimed and explained in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995) ("Consumer expectations do not constitute an independ-
ent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs."). Consumer expectations remain
the test, as opposed to the earlier "foreign/natural" test, for use in food cases. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
88. 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 1, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1963).
89. Following a number of courts, and perhaps a trend. The actual count of precisely which
jurisdictions employ precisely which liability test-consumer expectations or some version of
risk-utility-is fraught with difficulty as well as controversy. See generally Klemme, supra note
21, at 1177-82; Shapo, supra note 11, at 666-67 n.177; Vargo, supra note 21.
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product concerns the creation of a blueprint for the product concept,
defining the engineering configuration of its physical components or
its chemical (or biological) formulation. A product's design, in other
words, is the conceptual formulation of its physical "hardware"-
hardware which contains certain inherent risks when used by human
beings. Warnings and instructions, on the other hand, provide infor-
mation about those risks-what they are (warnings) and how to avoid
them (instructions).
Warnings and instructions thus provide consumers with informa-
tional "software" that helps them better understand the true utility +
cost + safety mix that constitutes each product. Providing safety infor-
mation to consumers promotes two ideals: (1) individual autonomy,
by helping consumers make informed choices in the selection and use
of products that each consumer decides contain the mix of utility +
cost + safety that best advances his or her personal goals; and (2) (op-
timal) safety, by providing consumers with information they may use
to reduce (optimally) the risks inherent in the products they choose to
purchase. 90
A. Defining Liability for Defective Warnings and Instructions
Despite these fundamental differences between the concepts of
product design on the one hand, and warnings and instructions on the
other, they are treated virtually identically in the definitions of defec-
tiveness in section 2 of the Products Liability Restatement. In fact,
the standard of liability in section 2(c) for defective warnings and in-
structions mirrors the standard of liability in section 2(b) for design
defectiveness almost word for word:
A "product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings"
if the "foreseeable risks" of the product "could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnns... and the
omission [thereof] renders the product not reasonably safe.""
Section 2(c) employs the same structural approach to defining liability
as section 2(b): the black letter rule is stated in terms that appear
strict, but the comments explain the rule in negligence terms.
The desirability of such a pig-is-a-mule definition was questioned
above in the context of design defectiveness, and it is even more de-
batable for warning and instruction liability. In the former context,
almost all courts at least pretend that liability under section 402A is
somehow "strict." In warnings cases, on the other hand, many courts
and commentators have long acknowledged that the relevant princi-
ples of so-called strict liability are largely, or entirely, based on negli-
90. See generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 315-17.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrr § 2(c) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
Mar. 13, 1995).
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gence. 2 And it was in the warnings context that the courts first broke
back through the strict liability sound barrier, as it were, holding that
there should be no duty to warn of unforeseeable risks, and that the
duty to warn should lie in negligence. 93 Thus, it was a warnings case,
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,9 that provided the occasion for the
New Jersey Supreme Court resoundingly to reject not only the Wade-
Keeton test of strict liability,95 after explicitly having endorsed it in
the Beshada case96 two years earlier, but also the very premises of
strict products liability as well.97
In warnings cases, therefore, the courts themselves in substantial
numbers have expressed a distinct preference not only for the princi-
ples of negligence law but, increasingly, for negligence doctrine, too.
98
In this context more than in design cases, most courts have seemed
doctrinally stuck in "strict" liability against their will, remaining there
perhaps because of the inertial power of section 402A of the Second
Restatement. But this doctrinal prison is entirely unnecessary, for
manufacturers are almost always liable under negligence doctrine on
basic risk-utility reasoning for failing to warn consumers of material
risks.99 And the Third Restatement agrees with the nearly universal
view that manufacturers should not be obligated to warn of risks that
cannot be foreseen."° What is left of warning "defectiveness" is only
negligence, nothing more.
Understanding why the Third Restatement formulates the black
letter basis of liability for inadequate warnings in strict liability defect
terms, rather than in pure negligence, is challenging to say the least.
92. See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note 12; M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to
Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 221 (1987).
93. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (prescription drug);
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (prescription drugs); Anderson v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991) (asbestos, extending the negligence basis of
liability for warnings to all products).
94. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
95. Rather than explicitly repudiating the Wade-Keeton test, the Feldman court redefined
"constructive knowledge" in conventional negligence terms, hence eviscerating the central fea-
ture of the test. Id. at 386; see also supra note 84.
96. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
97. Beshada had explained the basis of strict products liability in terms of risk spreading,
deterrence, and administrative efficiency. Id. at 544-45. By effectively overruling Beshada, Feld-
man implicitly rejected the very policies on which strict products liability has long been thought
to be based. See generally Principles of Justice, supra note 5, at 242-46; The Fault Pit, supra note
5, at 714-16.
98. See supra note 92.
99. The court in Moran- v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975), stated:
[Iun [negligence cases] the cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so minimal, amount-
ing only to the expense of adding some more printing to a label, that this [risk-utility] bal-
ancing process will almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of latent dangers,
if the manufacturer is otherwise required to do so.
Id. at 15.
100. This position is embraced in § 2(c)'s formulation of instruction and warning defects in
terms of risks that are foreseeable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2(c) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
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Perhaps there is a modicum of merit in maintaining a superficially
"strict" face on liability in warnings and instructions cases in order to
maintain a uniformity at least of superficial doctrine with the other
two forms of defectiveness. 10 1 But the predicate to this explanation is
the appropriateness of defining the design standard of liability itself in
strict defect terms, a quite dubious proposition as discussed above.
The Reporters argue that applying a strict facade to products liability
generally will help avoid certain problematic applications of the con-
ventional negligence defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk.'02 This argument collapses when one recognizes that the
doctrine of comparative fault has well harnessed both defenses across
the nation. 0 3 Perhaps, since many courts continue to speak of warn-
ings liability as "strict" under section 402A, one might make the argu-
ment here as well that the law should be restated as most courts are
stating it. But this should take on a look of bootstrap reasoning when
section 402A itself created this major doctrinal quandary. This leaves
only an aspirational and symbolic argument for stating "strictly" the
important rules of product safety responsibility, as discussed below.' 4
One might well conclude that aspiration is too fragile by itself to bear
the weight of pretending that pigs are mules.
In sum, the Third Restatement's decision to wrap warnings and
instructions liability in a defect shell that has a strict appearance is
dubious at best. A more forthright black letter definition of warnings
liability in conventional negligence terms would have been superior to
the chosen path of slipping negligence in the back door by clever
stealth. In its adoption of section 2(b), the ALI missed a major oppor-
tunity to restore common sense and credibility to the liability rules at
work in warnings cases.
B. Reasonableness in the Warnings Context
"Reasonableness" fully captures the principles of negligence that
underlie the new Restatement's standard of liability for instruction
and warning defects. A product is thus defective under section 2(c) if
reasonable instructions and warnings of foreseeable risks are not pro-
vided by reasonable means to persons who reasonably and foreseeably
need the information. 0 5 Many courts use the word "adequacy" to ex-
101. For whatever aesthetic value may lie in this form of doctrinal symmetry.
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
103. The Reporters elsewhere acknowledge this point themselves, noting that "the majority
of courts utilize comparative fault to reduce the recoveries of products liability plaintiffs." Id.
§ 12 Reporters' note to cmt. a. For a perceptive analysis of comparative fault at play in products
liability cases, see Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Com-
parative Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281 (1994).
104. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
105. This is a rough summary of § 2(c). "Subsection (c) of § 2 adopts a reasonableness test
for judging the adequacy of product instructions and warnings. It thus parallels § 2(b) which
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press this reasonableness notion in the warnings and instructions
context.1
0 6
In informational adequacy cases of this type, the reasonableness
requirement has two distinct components, one "substantive" and the
other formal or "procedural."'1 °7 The first, or substantive, component
requires that the informational content of warnings and instructions
be sufficient for the context, that they contain adequate types and
amounts of danger and safety information in view of the foreseeable
types and amounts of risk. Such communications must thus convey, as
far as reasonably practicable, accurate information on both the nature
and degree of danger. If the product may cause severe injury or
death, then warning of anything less will be inadequate, and therefore
"unreasonable" under section 2(c).
The second, or procedural, component requires that the informa-
tion be conveyed in a form and manner that is reasonably calculated
to reach and catch the attention of persons who need it. Thus, written
warnings and instructions must be presented in an appropriate size,
color, and style of type, and sometimes should be preceded by a head-
ing; pictures, bells, or buzzers will be necessary for certain types of
products, and labels, plaques, or tags must sometimes be affixed di-
rectly to the face of the product hardware; odors or colors may need
to be added to some dangerous gases and liquids that otherwise might
be invisible or look like water. Moreover, the distribution system for
safety information should reasonably assure that the information finds
its way to those personally at risk, or to others likely to act on their
behalf, and the risk information must be presented in language or
schematic pictorial form likely to penetrate the mind of the type of
persons likely to use the product. Thus, to serve their purposes and be
legally adequate, warnings and instructions must be "reasonable" both
in substance and in form.
The related principles of balance and optimality that dominate
the reasonableness inquiry in design defectiveness cases also apply to
warnings cases, but in a different way. In design cases, the goal is to
achieve an optimal mix of utility + cost + safety within a calculus
where both utility and cost often conflict with safety, where enhancing
safety often reduces a product's usefulness and increases its cost. 08 In
warnings cases, this type of competition among consumer values usu-
ally is much weaker. Although the goal here also is for optimal rather
than maximum safety, the provision of too much safety information
does not involve so clear a sacrifice of other interests as does the pro-
adopts a similar standard for judging the safety of product designs." RESTATEMENT (TmiRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
106. See id. See generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 315-
60.
107. See generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 326-27 n.8.
108. See Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 477-84.
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vision of excessive safety in design; safety information usually may be
added with negligible loss of utility and at minimal direct expense. 10 9
In this context, it is safety itself that may suffer when product risks are
exaggerated and when important safety information is drowned in a
sea of trivia. This is the problem of information overload, sometimes
called "warnings pollution," that results from promoting maximum in
lieu of optimal safety and danger information." 0
As with the definition of design defects in section 2(b), warning
and instruction defects are defined in section 2(c) and its comments in
terms of foreseeable risk, reasonableness, optimality, and balance.
These important underlying principles are the concepts that the courts
and commentators have found proper for resolving warning and in-
struction defect cases, and the new Products Liability Restatement
captures them in section 2(c). Yet, the Third Restatement fails to take
the proper final step of grounding them as well in negligence law doc-
trine. Instead, it stretches logic, common sense, and the English lan-
guage beyond good sense in order to force the liability standard based
on such principles into a strictly framed defect mold.
V. THE MAGIC LANGUAGE: "DEFECTIVE . .. NOT
REASONABLY SAFE"
The magic language has been changed. Section 402A of the Sec-
ond Restatement imposed strict liability for the sale of products in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to persons or property.
The phrases "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous"
were separately defined in separate comments, both in nearly identi-
cal consumer contemplation terms."' From the very start, and for
many years, courts and commentators struggled valiantly with the
meaning of this magic language."
2
Dean Prosser's early drafts of section 402A, in 1958 and 1960,
defined the liability standard in terms of "a condition dangerous to the
consumer," but members of the ALI Council complained that it was
109. See supra note 99.
110. The point is nicely captured in § 2 comment h:
[The reasonableness test] is more difficult to apply in the warnings context. Warnings that
are too numerous or detailed may be ignored and thus ineffective. It is also difficult to
determine the appropriate degree of intensity with which warnings should be transmitted.
Useful instructions and warnings call the user's attention to dangers that can be avoided by
careful product use, but [they] can be debased if attention must also be directed to trivial or
far-fetched risks.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORIS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995). Sources on this issue are collected in id. § 2 Reporters' note to cmt. h. Information
overload is a small piece of the much larger puzzle of why warnings are often ineffective. See
generally Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1193 (1994).
111. "Defective condition" is defined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g
(1964); "unreasonably dangerous" is defined id. § 402A cmt. i.
112. See generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 223-44.
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overbroad. In response, he overreacted, modifying "dangerous" with
"unreasonably" and "condition" with "defective," thus putting the op-
erative language of section 402A into its final form, "defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous."'1 13  When section 402A was first
debated on the floor of the American Law Institute in 1961, the
double-headed definition of the black letter liability standard was uni-
formly criticized as confusing, "gilding the lily," and promoting of mis-
chief,114  which criticisms have all proved true.1 5  The great
definitional debate came to a head in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,"6
which quixotically purged the much more meaningful "unreasonably
dangerous" portion of the phrase, because it "rings of negligence. "117
Yet truly it rings of negligence, and proudly so, because it is centered
in the important concept of "reasonableness" (and the connected no-
tions of optimality and balance) from whence it draws its power. In
time, of course, most courts eventually came to understand the full
phrase as signifying a unitary concept, captured ordinarily in the single
word of "defect" (or "defectiveness"). Understandably, however,
some courts still are led by the double-headed language in the stan-
dard to the confusing conclusion that the phrase must mean two
things.118
A. The Interpretive Confusion in the Design and Warnings Defect
Tests: Decoding Subsections 2(b) and (c)
Whether the new Restatement's similar use in sections 2(b) and
(c) of multiple definitional terms-"defective," "reasonable alterna-
tive design," and "not reasonably safe"-will generate another decade
or two of definitional confusion is an open question. Unfortunately,
the problem is compounded by the use in both subsections of extrane-
ous doctrine and confusing syntax" 9 that requires several readings
and heavy reliance on the comments to begin to understand. 120 This
type of linguistic confusion in the basic liability standards can cause
much mischief for it provides lawyers with grist for argument on alter-
native meanings that surely will confound busy judges with little time
113. See id. at 223.
114. Id. at 223-25.
115. See generally id. at 225-44 (chronicling the courts' struggle to understand the meaning
of "defective condition unreasonably dangerous").
116. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
117. Id. at 1162.
118. The trial court appears to have been so misled in Stinson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 904 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (semble). See KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY &
GREEN, supra note 5, at 242 n.3.
119. Leon Green's criticism of the first Restatement of Torts comes to mind: "The most
striking feature of the black letter sections ... is their stiffness and pompousness of expres-
sion.... smother[ing] ... [i]mportant ideas.., in a welter of insignificant ones raised by black
letter to the same level of importance." Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REv. 582,
591-92 (1935).
120. Perhaps not unlike this article.
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to divine the true meaning from the variety of different notions
stitched together awkwardly in black letter over several Restatement
drafts. Parsing the language of subsections 2(b) and (c) to determine
the true meaning of these basic tests of liability is not an easy task.
The parsing task of both subsections is probably best begun by
focusing on the single definition of design defectiveness in section
2(b).121 That section now provides:
[A] product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of
a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a prede-
cessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alter-
native design renders the product not reasonably safe.
1 22
In attempting to understand this language, it is helpful to begin by
stripping away the secondary doctrine on retailer liability that has no
business cluttering up the new Restatement's single most important
section, one which is complex and confusing enough in any event.
123
Once this stripping operation is accomplished, 124 at least a basic idea
of the section's meaning begins to peek through the mist:
A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by a reasonable
alternative design, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.
What does this decoded version of section 2(b) say to courts and law-
yers? Even in its stripped down iteration, the meaning of this test of
liability is not clear at all. A serial examination of the concepts ap-
pears to reveal two, or possibly three, independent normative poles
lurking in the test:
A product is defective in design when:
(1) the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design,
and
(2) the omission of the alternative design renders the product not rea-
sonably safe.
121. The definition of design defect in § 2(c) is closely paralleled by the definition of warn-
ings and instructions defects in § 2(c). See RESTATEMENT (TImRD) oF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIA-
BLITY § 2(c) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995). For a variety of reasons reflected in 30
years of judicial experience under § 402A, the liability test for design defectiveness promises to
be at once far more significant and subject to substantially greater interpretive confusion than
the test for defective warnings.
122. Id. § 2(b).
123. The retailer doctrine at issue is otherwise clearly and fully treated in the comments.
The Reporters assert that the particular doctrinal question at issue here is whether a retailer or
other downstream seller is strictly liable for defects (including design and warnings defects) at-
tributable to the manufacturer. But the comments clearly, forcefully, and unequivocally provide
that such downstream sellers are indeed strictly responsible for defects generated upstream. See
id. §§ 1 cmts. a & e, 2 cmt. n (explaining why such a harsh and often unnecessarily stringent
standard of responsibility is imposed on retailers). As for the general problem of placing secon-
dary doctrine in black letter, see supra note 119.
124. And some other extraneous language is peeled away. Herbert Weschler, who served as
the ALI Director for many years, pointed out the extraneousness of the "the adoption of" lan-
guage during the floor debate on § 2 in 1994.
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Reminiscent of the Cronin-type linguistic problem with section 402A,
where "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" was understand-
ably interpreted by many courts and lawyers to contain two separate
normative prongs-"defective condition" + "unreasonably danger-
ous"-section 2(b) might be interpreted to have as many as three such
prongs: (1) "defective" condition, (2) "reasonable alternative design,"
and (3) "not reasonably safe."
Perhaps the fairest interpretation of the language of section 2(b),
consistent with the structural interrelationship between sections 1 and
2, is revealed by emphasizing the "when": A product is "defective" in
design, making the seller subject to liability, when (1) a "reasonable
alternative design" was available and (2) the actual design was "not
reasonably safe." To borrow Learned Hand's formulaic approach to
definition, design defectiveness under this interpretation of section
2(b) might be expressed as follows:
D = RAD + NRS
where D means "defective," RAD means "reasonable alternative de-
sign," and NRS means "not reasonably safe."
Under this interpretation of section 2(b), it thus appears that a
plaintiff must establish two principal elements: (1) the existence of an
available alternative design that was reasonable (such that the manu-
facturer's failure to adopt it may have been unreasonable) and (2) that
the actual design was not reasonably safe, that it was unreasonable
(such that the manufacturer's adoption of it was in fact unreasonable).
The problem of understanding here, then, resolves down to the appar-
ent existence in the test of two apparently separate normative poles-
one positive and one negative-both of which are based on similar, or
identical, conceptions of reasonableness and either of which alone log-
ically would appear sufficient for the liability test.
This is not a welcome conclusion, for it leaves the interpreter of
section 2(b) in a conceptual muddle: either prongs (1) and (2) are
merely opposite sides of the same conceptual coin and hence identical,
RAD = NRS, or they are somehow different from one another. Un-
like the magic language in section 402A, neither of these two opera-
tive terms is specifically defined in the comments, which thus requires
the interpreter to make a careful study of a good portion of the 127
pages covered in Tentative Draft No. 2 by sections 1 and 2 in an at-
tempt to unearth their meanings. If the two terms are indeed synony-
mous, if a product is "not reasonably safe" because a "reasonable
alternative design" was available but omitted by the manufacturer,
then the concept of the test is comprehensible and may be applied
with little trouble. This interpretation of the standard may be ex-
pressed symbolically as follows:
D = RAD = NRS
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On this interpretation of the standard, juries might be instructed that
a manufacturer's design is defective, subjecting the manufacturer to
liability, if the manufacturer failed to adopt a reasonable available de-
sign. A careful trial court will be sorely tempted to stop the instruc-
tion on the liability test there, to avoid confusing the jury into thinking
that the plaintiff must prove something additional to RAD for the
manufacturer to be subject to liability.
Yet many courts may be expected to try to discern different
meanings in RAD and NRS because the concepts on their face are
obviously quite different: RAD applies a positive ("reasonable") stan-
dard to a hypothetical alternative design, whereas NRS applies a nega-
tive ("not reasonably safe") standard to the product's actual design. If
indeed the two terms mean something different from one another,
then this is where the grand confusion will begin, for there is nothing
in the comments that directly explains either the meaning of or the
relationship between RAD and NRS, but the comments do provide a
rich array of opportunities for guessing. 12 5 And so most courts and
lawyers are provided with little help in trying to understand the mean-
ing of this central defect concept in the tests of liability as they are
formulated in the Third Restatement.
But there is one final place to search for the meaning of section
2(b) which may hold a key to understanding its proper interpreta-
tion-in the prior drafts that document historically its journey from
conception to its present form. In its early iterations, the Reporters
had indeed initially defined "design defect" in terms of a single nor-
mative pole, based on RAD, by which a design was deemed defective
"if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.'
'1 26
A court or lawyer who proceeds this far in the deconstruction process
may thus conclude with reasonable confidence that the two standards
of defectiveness now appearing in sections 2(b) and (c) are really
one. 127 And if the interpreter searches even deeper in the "legislative
history" of the section, the reason for this strange bipolar definition of
a single concept will be revealed, for the Reporters note that the
Council insisted that they infuse the seemingly sterile RAD standard
with some substantive content. 128 And so the confusing definitional
125. Perhaps the ripest possibility for such empty vessel guessing is the notion of consumer
expectations. Although the concept is explicitly relegated to factor status in comments e and f,
its substantial power under § 402A, which drew upon the conceptual underpinnings of both the
law of contracts and the law of torts, may provide some courts with justification for pouring once
again consumer expectations into the standard of liability via the vessel of "not reasonably safe."
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (Preliminary Draft No.
1, Apr. 20, 1993); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (Council
Draft No. 1, Sept. 17, 1993).
127. Yet there exists another quite plausible interpretation: that the addition of NRS to
Council Draft 1A was intended for a purpose.
128. The Reporters noted in pertinent part that
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technique of using bipolar definitions to express perhaps a single lia-
bility concept is seen to have been forced upon the Reporters by the
Council, just as happened to Dean Prosser in the development of sec-
tion 402A thirty-three years earlier.129 In both cases, the definition of
a (two-humped) camel 130 comes uncomfortably to mind.
131
But this still leaves open the question of whether the Council was
intending to add a second and different normative pole to the liability
definitions in sections 2(b) and (c) instead conceived of RAD as in-
volving the purely technical question of whether a feasible alternative
design was available at the time. The latter interpretation is recom-
mended by much of the case law which treats the availability of a fea-
sible design alternative as a largely technical precondition to the
normative question of whether the product's risks exceeded fair con-
sumer expectations or the product's benefits. 132 But the former inter-
pretation is supported by the observations of one Reporter, Professor
Aaron Twerski, who has explained that at least one purpose for ad-
ding the NRS prong was to dispel the notion that there can only be
but one lawful design for any type of product. This is an important
problem involving the common situation in which there are multiple
product designs intended to serve the same function. 1
33
This problem may be illustrated by a power saw example. Power
saws with reciprocating blades and chain saws both were invented and
commercially developed to cut down trees and divide them into logs.
One design or the other will turn out in the long run to be objectively
more dangerous, yet perhaps no more useful or less expensive than
the other. It may not be the place of products liability law to force
juries to decide that only one type of power saw, necessarily danger-
ous to a large extent itself, is "lawful" in our society; both types may
be reasonable approaches to relieving men and women of the burden
of sawing manually. While a monopolar "reasonable alternative de-
sign" method of defining defectiveness would appear to require
[tihe black letter now states that for a product to be defective either in design or due to
inadequate instructions or warnings, it must be established that the omission of the reason-
able alternative design or warning renders the product "not reasonably safe." This change
reflects the strong view at the Council meeting that the concept of "reasonable safety"
should not be relegated to the comments but must be part of the definition of defect in the
black letter.
Memorandum from the Reporters to ALl Council Members 1 (Dec. 28, 1993), in RESTATEMENT
(THiRD) OF TORTS: PRODucrs LIABILTY (Council Draft No. 1A, Jan. 4, 1994). A similar con-
cern, that the RAD test alone appeared substantively sterile, was earlier expressed at the Con-
sultative Group's meeting with the Reporters in June 1993.
129. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
130. As a horse (defectively) designed by a committee.
131. As does the maxim, plus fa change ....
132. See generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 293-95 (ex-
amining importance of feasible design alternative to plaintiff's case).
133. See generally Hildy Bowbeer, The ALI's Restatement on Products Liability: Some
Early Concerns and Suggested Revisions, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 785 (July 23,
1993) (analyzing the Third Restatement's effect when more than one reasonable alternative de-
sign is available).
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branding one such saw illegal, adding a second normative pole of "not
reasonably safe" to the definition would allow a jury to find both
types of saw socially acceptable. Interpreting NRS in this manner
makes good sense in terms of policy and fairness and argues for a
bipolar interpretation of sections 2(b) and (c) along these lines.
Regardless of whether one concludes that RAD and NRS are
equivalent, that RAD = NRS, section 2 contains two additional, possi-
bly normative terms-"defect" and "defective." For many years now,
courts and commentators have used these two words in a conclusory,
nonsubstantive sense to mean nothing more than "subject to liability"
under section 402A.'3 4 In the Third Restatement, section 2 refers
back to section 1, which establishes the primary definitional structure,
so that sections 1 and 2 fairly must be read together. When this is
done, the words "defect" and "defective" are seen in fact to be em-
ployed in the conclusory sense that they generally have acquired. Un-
derstood in this manner, "defectiveness" is substantively empty and
merely descriptive of the single end-condition of liability-that the
product is (on other, substantive grounds) "bad" in law. "Defect" and
"defective" thus are seen as summary characterizations of the liability
standards substantively defined in section 2 and its comments. In in-
terpreting the liability standards of section 2, therefore, "defective"
should be viewed merely as a hollow, conclusory term which serves
only as a vehicle for interconnecting the substantive liability tests of
section 2 with the result of passing (perhaps "failing" better describes
the point) the test-("strict") liability-of section 1. As structurally
complex and awkward as this definitional approach may appear, it
does permit the basic "strict" liability rule to be stated simply and
uniformly in section 1.
Thus, sections 2(b) and (c) may be decoded to reveal either a
monopolar basis of liability or one that is bipolar, both of which are
logical. Yet, either manner of decoding section 2 is at once complex
and quite unsatisfactory in requiring detailed analysis of various Re-
statement drafts, possibly reliance on one Reporter's recollections of a
rationale, and in either case a convoluted twisting of the language of
section 2. While the Twerski bipolar explanation of sections 2(b) and
(c) makes good sense and appears to fit the language of the defini-
tions, there appears to be no basis for it in the comments which if
anything appear to point the other way. In sum, sections 2(b) and (c)
remain inscrutable at various levels of logical and linguistic analysis,
leaving the courts with the daunting task of reconstructing and ex-
plaining to juries the basic definition of defectiveness in design and
warnings cases.
134. This proposition is axiomatic. For example, the chapter examining the basic tests, theo-
ties, and limits to liability in KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, is entitled
"The Concept of Defectiveness."
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B. Understanding the Tests for Design and Warnings Defects:
Reconstructing Subsections 2(b) and (c)
The defectiveness notions in design (and warnings) cases may be
reformulated in a variety of helpful ways consistent with the theory
and basic approach of sections 1 and 2 of the Third Restatement.
First, however, continuing the primary focus here on design liability, it
is important to summarize the fundamental ideas that are properly
captured within the liability concept. In basic terms, a manufacturer
generally should be liable for harm attributable to a product design if
the manufacturer reasonably should have designed the product in a
different manner that would have prevented the harm. More specifi-
cally, a product fairly may be deemed defective in design if there was
available at the time an alternative design that was (1) foreseeably
safer, both overall and in respect to the risk that caused the plaintiff's
harm, (2) technologically and practicably feasible, and (3) on balance
materially better overall than the actual design with respect to the bal-
ance of (a) safety, (b) utility, and (c) CoSt. 135 These are the key con-
cepts or elements that are in fact included in section 2(b) but hidden
by the syntax of the black letter or scattered in the comments.
The liability standard reformulation process may be begun with
the decoded version of section 2(b) set forth above:
A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by a reasonable
alternative design and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.
The standard can be stripped of the problematic conjunctive defini-
tion and otherwise clarified to read as follows:
A product is defective in design if its foreseeable risks of harm could
have been reduced by a feasible alternative design the omission of which
renders the product not reasonably safe.
By replacing "reasonable" with "feasible,"' 36 converting RAD to
FAD, the standard in this form still contains two key elements, but
only one of them is normatively significant; important as it is to liabil-
ity, the feasible alternative design requirement (unlike RAD) is an el-
ement that involves issues of technological practicability which are
capable of objective proof and determination. This important altera-
tion of the definition properly isolates NRS as the sole normative
pole, thereby curing much of the confusion generated by the final,
apparently bipolar definition.'37
135. See generally Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 477-84.
136. During the 1994 ALl floor debate on § 2 of Tentative Draft No. 1, one Reporter agreed
that "feasible" might be preferable to "reasonable" in the liability standard but concluded with
the other Reporter that the definitional process had progressed too far to admit of change, that
the "clay had hardened"-a notion promptly dubbed the "hard clay" theory of draft
immutability.
137. It also conforms more closely to the language of judicial decisions.
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The test for design defectiveness may be strengthened further by
focusing closely on what should be balanced against what in determin-
ing the adequacy of a product's design. Courts and commentators
have experienced enormous difficulty in deciding precisely what
should be balanced in such cases, 138 and the design defect test should
be reformulated in a way that helps to clarify this issue. Generally,
the proper focal point for the risk-utility balance is the particular
safety feature of the alternative design proposed by the plaintiff that
would have prevented or reduced the plaintiff's harm. 13 9 The Third
138. See, e.g., Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980) (Lukowsky, J.,
concurring) (child's cotton-poly blend T-shirt; "the manufacturer is not liable unless ... the
magnitude of the danger to the claimant outweighed the utility of the product to the public").
139. Ordinarily, therefore, what are relevant are the incremental ("marginal") risks and ben-
efits of adopting the particular design safety feature proposed by the plaintiff-those (that would
have been) incurred in moving from the manufacturer's actual design to the plaintiff's hypothet-
ical alternative design. The results of this kind of incremental balance may be ascertained di-
rectly, by determining the foreseeable costs and benefits attributable solely to the particular
design feature proposed by the plaintiff. For example, if the issue is the defectiveness of an
outboard motor not equipped with a propeller guard, the proper inquiry concerns the balance of
risks and benefits that would result from adding such a guard-not the risks and benefits of
outboard motors generally, without such guards, and certainly not the broader risks and benefits
of power boats propelled by such motors. See Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993) (correctly balancing the incremental risks and benefits of adding such a guard). Simi-
larly, a plaintiff's proposed design feature might involve removing some hazardous portion of
the product, such as a dangerous hood ornament on a car. Cf Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 329
P.2d 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). Here, the only pertinent risks and benefits would concern the
removal of the hood ornament from the car-not the broader risks and benefits of cars that
happen to sport sharp hood ornaments.
Many courts frame the question indirectly, however, in terms of the overall costs and bene-
fits of the product design taken ag a whole-the risks and benefits of "the product," presumably
the accident product as actually designed by the manufacturer. See, e.g., Banks v. ICI Americas,
Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994) (adopting "a test balancing the risks inherent in a product
design against the utility of the product so designed"); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.
2d 248, 254 (Miss. 1993) (adopting risk-utility analysis, defined as whether "the utility of the
product is outweighed by the danger that the product creates"). This formulation of the risk-
utility balance in macro-product terms seriously misstates the nature of the true issue and proper
analytical process in most design defect cases, thus confusing the question of what properly
should be balanced against what. Although the macro-balancing approach may be converted to
a form that will yield correct results, it requires no less than three separate balances, the first two
"internal" to the two competing designs on trial:
(1) the balance of risks and benefits of the accident product's actual design-which gener-
ates a net value of the product overall as actually designed;
(2) the balance of risks and benefits of a hypothetical alternative design that would have
prevented or reduced the harm-which generates a net value of the product overall as it might
alternatively have been designed; and
(3) the net value of (1) balanced against the net value of (2)-the value of the product
overall as actually designed balanced against the value of the product overall as alternatively
designed.
Under this macro-balancing approach, the net value outcomes generated by the internal
balances of (1) and (2) provide the values for the ultimate external balance described in (3); and
the third, "external" balance determines which of the two competing designs-the actual or the
alternative-is (on balance) "better" overall. Macro-product balancing along these lines should
yield correct defectiveness determinations, but the process is far more complicated than that
involved in micro-balancing the marginal risks and benefits of the particular safety feature pro-
posed by plaintiff. The Third Restatement touches only indirectly upon the macro-micro balanc-
ing distinction, in comments c, d, and e to § 2, in connection with the reasonable design
alternative requirement. The comments suggest that the risk and benefit factors are applicable
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Restatement test may be altered to sharpen this focus, 14 0 by shifting
attention away from the "not reasonably safe" pole, that concerns the
actual design, toward the pole that involves the "reasonableness" of
the alternative design. The standard may in this way be formulated as
follows:
A product is defective in design if a feasible alternative design was
foreseeably safer and reasonable.
So revised, the standard is now clear and reduced in large mea-
sure to its essentials.141 As so constructed, however, "reasonable" it-
self may well be unnecessarily vague, and the clarity of the liability
test is measurably enhanced by setting forth explicitly the key subcon-
cepts that lie within the general notion of "reasonable." In its clearest
and fullest formulation, the liability test for design defectiveness thus
may be defined something like the following:
A product is defective in design if a feasible alternative design was
foreseeably safer and better overall in terms of its balance of safety, utility,
and cost.
This key-element form of definition, or one along these lines,142 seems
to reformulate comprehensibly the Third Restatement's definition of
the standard of liability. It captures the most important aspects of
design defectiveness, describing with particularity the ultimate balanc-
ing process for determining the "better" design, 143 and it excludes ex-
traneous secondary concepts from the principal definition. Finally,
and importantly, it expresses at a glance-within the black letter and
without the need for herculean decoding-the essential requirements
for liability based on the concept of deviation from a proper safety
norm.'
144
to actual as well as alternative designs, and they fail to describe the proper relationship between
the two. This important topic is largely beyond the scope of the present article but is explored
more thoroughly elsewhere. See David G. Owen, The Risk-Utility Test for Design Defectiveness:
Toward a Proper Balance, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. (forthcoming 1997).
140. The focus sharpening is necessarily incomplete, since the objective here is to clarify the
Third Restatement's defect tests with minimal conceptual and linguistic change.
141. Moreover, the "foreseeably safer" formulation appears to afford fair protection to
manufacturers in the multiple-safe-product situation examined earlier.
142. A variety of similar approaches may work as well or better, for example:
(1) A product is defective in design if it feasibly could have been designed more safely
in a manner that was better overall in terms of its foreseeable risks, utility, and cost; or
(2) A product is defective in design if a feasible alternative design was foreseeably
safer and better overall in regard to its mix of safety, utility, and cost; or
(3) A product is defective in design if a feasible alternative design contained a better
overall balance of foreseeable risks, utility, and cost.
Each of these approaches more or less accomplishes the purpose of conceptual and linguistic
clarity that is so essential in the test of liability, and certainly there are others that achieve the
same result.
143. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
144. The notion of a "proper safety norm" provides a powerful, unifying foundation for all
three forms of defect. From this perspective, § 1 and § 2 may be decoded to look something like
the following:
§ 1. Commercial Seller's Liability for Harm Caused by Defective Products
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The advantages of redefining "defectiveness" along such clear
and simple lines should be self-evident. Such straightforward and
comprehensible definitions reveal for courts and lawyers (and juries)
the true meaning of the liability standards, and there simply is no good
reason for forcing those who need to know the law to struggle in every
case to try to understand the confusing liability definitions of section
2. The interpretative problems surrounding the Products Liability Re-
statement's liability test formulations are profound and will no doubt
provide much grist for many future essays as confusion unfolds with
time in one court opinion after another. Yet, the courts themselves
may make the fix judicially by redesigning the liability tests for design
and warnings defectiveness clearly and comprehensibly along the lines
discussed above.
1 45
C. Changing "Unreasonably Dangerous" to "Not Reasonably Safe"
The magic language in the Third Restatement has been changed
in another way: the phrase "not reasonably safe" was substituted for
the "unreasonably dangerous" language in section 402A. The impor-
tant question here is whether the change from the "unreasonably dan-
gerous" language of the Second Restatement was intended to alter the
fundamental test of liability. It would seem that this linguistic change
was somewhat more than stylistic, that the language was altered at
least to alert the legal community that certain substantive changes
were being made in the old liability standard of section 402A. The
liability test under section 402A, it will be recalled, was explicitly de-
fined in terms of consumer expectations,146 which the Third Restate-
ment equally explicitly relegates to "factor" status.147  Further, the
liability standards of the Third Restatement are enormously embel-
lished by copious doctrinal and explanatory particularizations in the
(a) One engaged in the business of selling products who sells a defective product is subject
to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the product defect.
(b) A product is defective only if, at the time of sale, it departs from a proper safety norm
in manufacture, design, or due to inadequate warnings or instructions, as defined in § 2.
§ 2. Proper Safety Norms for Establishing Product Defect
For purposes of determining defectiveness under Section 1, the proper safety norms are:
(a) With respect to manufacturing defects, the manufacturer's intended design.
(b) With respect to design defects, an alternative design that was foreseeably safer, feasible,
and better overall in terms of its balance of safety, utility, and cost.
(c) With respect to warnings and instructions defects, an alternative warning or instruction
that was foreseeably safer, feasible, and reasonable.
As in § 2(b), key elements might well be substituted for "reasonable" in § 2(c).
145. This assumes that courts will decide to retain a standard of liability for design defect
cases that is strict in form. As in the warnings context, there is much to commend a simple
return to negligence doctrine for determining liability in such cases. See, e.g., Powers, supra note
12.
146. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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comments 148 reflecting decades of judicial (and legislative) construc-
tion of a major edifice around this mushrooming 149 area of the law.
Had the "unreasonably dangerous" phrase been retained, courts and
commentators might have wondered how much precedential value to
attach to "old" section 402A cases using the "unreasonably danger-
ous" language but employing now outdated doctrine. The Restate-
ment slate, in other words, is now brushed clean.'
50
Finally, the "not reasonably safe" standard adopts as the ex-
pected norm for products a positive standard-reasonable "safety"-
replacing the old unreasonably "dangerous" negative formulation of
the norm. It is true, of course, that danger inheres in every product,
so that the central question of "How much safety is enough?" that
arises in every design case 15' in fact must turn on whether the amount
of danger was excessive ("unreasonable") in view of a broad-based
calculus of costs and benefits.' 52 Yet it may just be that the Products
Liability Restatement for the twenty-first century properly elevates
the norm, aspirationally, to one of (reasonable) safety. The actual
legal test of liability is not thereby raised in concrete terms, but the
new safety standard serves symbolically to provide a signal that (rea-
sonable) product safety-as a positive goal required by the law-must
now be afforded a central place in the decisional calculus of manufac-
turers. And so, while certain changes to the magic language in the
Third Restatement will undoubtedly generate serious confusion, other
changes may make good sense.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON DEFECTIVENESS: OBVIOUS DANGERS,
MISUSE, AND STATE OF THE ART
The question of defectiveness has so far focused on the elements
of a plaintiff's case, conditions that must be proven to establish a
product "defect." Liability standards, such as those in sections 1 and
2, are necessarily framed in terms of the elements that minimally com-
148. The standards are also discussed in the Reporters' notes. One might have wished that
the most important rules of defectiveness poured into a single section, § 2, had been separately
articulated and given separate black letter status each unto itself. Such a particularized division
of the rules in black letter form would have focused analysis and debate more clearly and fully
on each such rule, each of which would have had separate comments of its own. Yet such a
detailed approach to the subject matter would have taken a good deal more work and time, and
the ALl leadership in the early stages of the project appeared anxious to move the Third Re-
statement ahead with all due speed. By early 1995, the reporters themselves appeared to have
run out of steam, as evidenced by their desire to restrict the scope of the remaining topics ad-
dressed in this Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrry in-
troductory note (Preliminary Draft No. 3, May 18, 1995).
149. "Mushroomed" in some respects may be more accurate, for most products liability doc-
trine was substantially in place by the end of the 1970s. Yet there is no denying that the output
of decisional and statutory law in this field continues rapidly to expand.
150. 1 am grateful to Aaron Twerski for explaining this rationale.
151. And, to a lesser extent, in warnings cases.
152. The calculus includes, importantly, consumer expectations. See RESTATEMENT
(TrnRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCtrS LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
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prise the legal wrong at its center. Important questions also lie on the
outer edges of the defect concept, factors arguing against liability, that
help define the outer boundaries of the liability standards. The three
most fundamental liability-limiting issues of this type that courts have
grappled with for many years concern (1) the obviousness of a product
danger, (2) product misuse, and (3) the state of the art. 53 Considera-
ble doctrine has developed around each of these three issues, 54 and
the Third Restatement addresses each in the comments to sections 1
and 2.155
A. Obvious Dangers
[W]e hardly believe it is any more necessary to tell an experienced fac-
tory worker that he should not put his hand into a machine that is at that
moment breaking glass than it would be necessary to tell a zookeeper to
keep his head out of a hippopotamus' mouth.
1 56
The obviousness of a product danger has long played a significant
role in the determination of defectiveness. The strongest cases of
product defect have always involved a hidden or "latent" danger un-
suspected by the victim who walks into a kind of trap.'57 If, on the
other hand, a product danger is open and obvious for all to see, the
case for defectiveness weakens since the purchaser not only obtains
the benefit of the bargain but also generally controls the risk and so
bears responsibility for taking protective steps from harm. 5 '
In Campo v. Scofield,'159 an early classic of products liability law,
the New York Court of Appeals announced the "patent-danger doc-
trine," holding that a manufacturer "is under no duty to guard against
injury from a patent peril."'" While the patent-danger rule was zeal-
ously adopted by most courts, its illogic and unfairness as an absolute
bar to liability in design cases became increasingly obvious, especially
in cases where a simple guard or other minimal design change would
153. The Reporters, in § 2 comments c and d, address an emerging limitation on defective-
ness that involves such inherently dangerous product categories as alcoholic beverages, tobacco,
firearms, above-ground swimming pools, toy guns that shoot hard rubber pellets, and exploding
cigars, addressed above in the context of the formulation of a proper standard for design defec-
tiveness. Id. § 2 cmts. c & d.
154. See generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 360-463 (ex-
ploring limitations on defectiveness).
155. The issue is also addressed, to some extent, in RESTATEMENT (TiuRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCrs LIABILITY §§ 4, 7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
156. Bartkewich v. Billinger, 247 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1968).
157. See, e.g., Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. 1956) (moving metal parts,
hidden beneath armrest of outdoor lounge chair displayed in store, amputated plaintiff's finger
"with the ease that one clips a choice flower with pruning shears," causing finger to fall limply to
the floor).
158. As explained in terms of moral theory in Moral Foundations, supra note 5, at 476-77.
159. 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950) (plaintiff's hand caught in onion-topping machine lacking
guards or stopping device).
160. Id. at 804.
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have cured the danger.' 6 ' The death knell for the rule was finally
sounded when the New York high court itself repudiated the doctrine,
holding that the obviousness of a danger logically weakens a plain-
tiff's case of design defectiveness but should not destroy it alto-
gether. 62 The patent-danger doctrine has now been buried as an
absolute no-duty rule for design cases in almost every state, and it is
put to final rest by the Third Restatement. The comments officially
declare that the obviousness of a product's dangers in design is only
one among the many factors (if sometimes an important one) to be
considered in the calculus of design defectiveness.
163
In warnings cases, on the other hand, the obviousness of a prod-
uct danger often properly continues to play a decisive no-duty role, as
many courts have held."6 If a danger is truly obvious, 65 then its very
obviousness informs potential victims of the danger, so that the infor-
mational goals of warnings have been fulfilled. In such cases, there is
no value in providing warnings of dangers that should be known al-
ready, and the (nonmonetary) costs may be substantial. 66 The Third
Restatement adopts this view,x6 1 which makes good sense.
B. Product Misuse
We cannot charge the manufacturer of a knife when it is used as a tooth-
pick and the user complains because the sharp edge cuts.
168
161. As was the case in Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956). Perhaps the
classic criticism of the rule, in terms of rhetoric if not logic, is in Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 476
P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) ("The manufacturer of the obviously dangerous product
ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think, ought to
discourage misdesign rather than encourage it in its obvious form.").
162. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
163. The point is principally addressed in § 2 comment c:
Subsection (b) does not recognize the obviousness of a design-related risk as precluding
a finding of defectiveness. The fact that a danger is open and obvious is relevant to the issue
of defectiveness, but does not necessarily preclude a plaintiff from establishing that a rea-
sonable alternative design should have been adopted that would have reduced or prevented
harm to the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995); see also id. § 2 cmt. k. Of course, like any factor in the calculus, it may be determina-
tive on the facts of a particular case, even as a matter of law. See, e.g., Kirk v. Hanes Corp., 16
F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 1994) (risk that brother might burn little sister with disposable butane lighter).
164. For a selection of cases on the topic, see KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN,
supra note 5, at 366-80.
165. Obviousness probably should be considered a factual issue reasonably subject to dis-
pute. See, e.g., Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 731 (1st Cir. 1986). Contra Smith
v. Hub Mfg., 634 F. Supp. 1505, 1508 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that it is a question of law for the
court).
166. Warnings in this situation generate "warnings pollution." See supra note 110 and ac-
companying text.
167. Section 2 cmt. i states: "In general, no duty exists to warn or instruct regarding risks
and risk avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable prod-
uct users." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (Tentative Draft
No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
168. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977).
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An original premise of strict products liability was that the injury
arose out of proper product use. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc.,169 the fountainhead of strict liability in tort for defective
products, Judge Traynor carefully limited manufacturer responsibility
to "intended" use. 7 ° Section 402A's predecessor and parallel theory
of strict products liability based in contract, the implied warranty of
merchantability, is quite similarly confined in scope to fitness for "or-
dinary" use.' 7 ' Liability under section 402A itself is explicitly re-
stricted in the comments to injuries arising out of "normal" use. 7 2
Finally, the various negligence theories of products liability, as tradi-
tionally defined, contain similar built-in limitations on liability for in-
tended, "lawful," and "probable" use.
17 3
Limiting liability along some such lines appears to make good
sense, for serious product abuse may be viewed as "use or handling so
unusual that the average consumer could not reasonably expect the
product to be designed and manufactured to withstand it-a use
which the seller, therefore, need not anticipate and provide for."' 74
As products liability law developed, however, it soon became appar-
ent that the traditional doctrine's limitation to intended or ordinary
use coped poorly with the realities of the world-where infants will
sometimes drink bright cherry-red furniture polish, 175 nightgowns will
sometimes brush momentarily against burners of electric stoves,
176
and cars will often crash. 177 Accordingly, the courts quite quickly ex-
panded the scope of responsibility to include injuries from not only
169. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
170. He stated:
Implicit in the machine's presence on the market ... was a representation that it would
safely do the jobs for which it was built .... To establish the manufacturer's liability it was
sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was
intended to be used as a result of the defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was
not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.
Id. at 901 (emphasis added).
171. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2)(c) (1978); see also id. §§ 2-314 cmt. 13, 2-316(3)(b) & cmt. 8 & 2-
715(2)(b) cmt. 5. For a good example, see Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir.
1980) (throwing beer bottle against telephone pole is not an "ordinary" purpose).
172. The Second Restatement provides: "A product is not in a defective condition when it is
safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal [use], the seller is
not liable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (1964); see also id. § 402A ant. g
(defectiveness not established by harm from "mishandling"); id. § 402A cmt. i (no unreasonable
danger if harm from "over-consumption"); id. § 402A cmt. j (no duty to warn of generally
known risks of excessive use; seller may assume warnings will be read and heeded).
173. See id. § 388 (negligent warnings-liability for harm from "use of the chattel in the
manner for which ... it is supplied"); id. § 395 (negligent manufacture-liability for harm caused
by chattel's "lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is supplied"); id. § 398 (negli-
gent design-liability for harm from "probable use," special application of § 395). In addition, it
should be noted that a number of state legislatures have adopted misuse defenses as a form of
products liability reform legislation. See KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note
5, at 396.
174. Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1973).
175. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
176. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
177. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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intended (and ordinary) uses but also injuries from all uses and mis-
uses that are foreseeable.1
78
The Third Restatement limits responsibility in the black letter
definitions of design and warnings defects to "the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product." Arguably, at least, risks may generally
be foreseeable only if they arise from foreseeable types of product
use. 1 79 Thus, the black letter definitions of design and warnings defec-
tiveness in section 2 appear to build in a limitation on responsibility to
injuries arising out of foreseeable product use. Consistent with the
developed doctrine of misuse discussed above, the comments
powerfully explain the unfairness of holding manufacturers accounta-
ble for unforeseeable product abuse18 0 and now make clear' 8 ' that a
product is not defective, and its seller is shielded altogether from lia-
bility, with respect to injuries caused by the product's unforeseeable
misuse, modification, or alteration. 182 Less clear is the Restatement's
position on how the concepts of misuse, (proximate) causation, and
damages apportionment fit together, which involves a host of complex
problems that are mentioned but not examined in the comments.1
8 3
Nor do the comments resolve whether the burden of pleading and
proof on the foreseeability of use rests upon the plaintiff or the de-
fendant,"8 an important issue on which jurisdictions differ. The con-
178. Many courts have helpfully framed the foreseeability notion here as elsewhere in terms
of "reasonableness": "We conclude ... that 'reasonable foreseeability' is the appropriate test,
and thus [the product should not be] unreasonably dangerous when used for a purpose and in a
manner that is reasonably foreseeable." Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 355.
179. The first sentence to cmt. I interprets §§ 2(b)-(c). See infra note 180.
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmts. I (foreseeability
of use and risks) & o (misuse, modification, and alteration) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13,
1995). Comment I provides in part:
1. Reasonably foreseeable uses and risks in design and warning claims. Subsections (b)
and (c) of § 2 impose liability only when the product is put to uses that it is reasonable to
expect a seller or distributor to foresee. Product sellers and distributors are not required to
foresee and take precautions against every conceivable mode of use and abuse to which
their products might be put.
The requirement of reasonable foreseeability reflects concern for not only whether a
reasonable actor would have anticipated particular modes of product use and consumption,
but also whether such modes are unusually and unreasonably dangerous. Increasing the
costs of designing and marketing products in order to avoid the consequences of unreasona-
ble modes of use is not required. Reasonably careful product users should not be expected,
through higher prices, to subsidize careless or reckless users.
Id. § 2 cmt. 1.
181. Treatment of this issue was muddled in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2 cmts. i, I (Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 12, 1994).
182. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmts. 1, o (Tentative
Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
183. See id. § 2 cmt. o, § 10 cmt. b (causation); id. § 12 cmt. c (damages apportionment for
plaintiff misconduct); see also id. § 10 cmt. b, Reporters' note (misuse and causation); § 12 cmt.
c, Reporters' note (misuse and plaintiff misconduct).
184. The commentary on this point is confusing. Section 2 comment c provides: "Once the
plaintiff establishes that the product was put to a reasonably foreseeable use .... " but the final
paragraph to cmt. o notes the jurisdictional split and concludes as follows: "The allocation of
burdens in this regard is not addressed in this Restatement and is left to local law." Id. § 2 cmt.
0.
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ventional and better rule at common law places the burden on the
plaintiff as a part of the obligation to establish the defectiveness of the
product. 185
C. State of the Art
A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the safety features which
are incorporated in automobiles made today.
86
Because knowledge in science and engineering is by nature in-
complete, some product dangers are not discoverable, and some risk
avoidance measures are not achievable, until after a product has been
manufactured, sold, and caused an injury. The terms "undiscover-
able," "unknowable," and "unavoidable" are often used (frequently
interchangeably) by courts and commentators in describing dangers of
this type. Another phrase often applied to this issue is "state of the
art"-as in the "state of the art defense" or "state of the art evi-
dence." Although the state of the art concept is variously defined in
differing contexts by different courts,187 the basic idea is that a product
risk was unknown, or the means of avoiding it unknown or unavaila-
ble, at the time the product was manufactured and sold.
The fundamental problem in this context concerns the inability of
the manufacturer to control the risk. As easy as the problem is to
state, however, the surrounding issues of legal doctrine and social pol-
icy have proved exceedingly complex. The state of the art issue goes
to the very heart of the notions of strict liability, negligence, defective-
ness, and foreseeable risk. Probably for this reason, the most spectac-
ular battles in all of products liability law have been fought over the
"state of the art" issue of who, as between the manufacturer and po-
tential victims, should bear the burden of unforeseeable risks.
1 s
"State of the art" was the issue in the celebrated duo of New
Jersey cases mentioned earlier, Beshada and Feldman,"9 which in
combination vividly portrayed the conflicting tensions that lurk within
it. Until Feldman in 1984 joined issue with the Beshada holding, on
whether the knowability of a product danger at the time of sale should
make a difference in rendering "strict" liability determinations, the
cases on "state of the art" went every which way-not only in result,
but also on the very meaning of the term, as mentioned earlier. To
some, especially manufacturers, the phrase traditionally has meant lit-
185. See generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 390 n.4.
186. Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976).
187. The same is true of legislatures, a number of which have enacted some form of state of
the art defense. See infra note 196.
188. See generally KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 409-63 (ex-
ploring the problem of unavoidable dangers). The state of the art issue, pitting strict against
fault-based liability, is a weighty problem in moral theory. See Moral Foundations, supra note 5,
at 484 (concluding that "[ultility theory, as truth and equality, thus suggests that manufacturers
are not morally accountable for generic dangers that cannot reasonably be discovered").
189. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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tie more than the knowledge and techniques prevailing in (and hence
the custom of) the industry at the time of manufacture; to others, es-
pecially plaintiffs, it has meant the ultimate in science or technology
existing at the time anywhere in the world.'" Most courts and legisla-
tures, however, have sought to moderate the concept by defining it
somewhere in between in terms such as "the best technology reason-
ably available at the time."' 91 Tentative Draft No. 1 defined "state of
the art" as "the safest technology developed and in commercial use at
a given time,"'" a somewhat more specific definition that also prop-
erly stakes out a middle-ground position close to where the law is be-
ginning rationally to settle. But the Reporters changed their minds.
Bowing to the impracticality of formulating for all purposes a nebu-
lous concept subject to such disparate definitions, they abandoned al-
together in Tentative Draft No. 2 their earlier effort to institutionalize
a single general definition.
93
The most salient issue under the state of the art umbrella con-
cerns responsibility for risks that are unforeseeable at the time of sale.
Here, as discussed earlier in connection with foreseeability of risk, 94
most cases and the Third Restatement come down quite squarely
favoring a negligence-type, foreseeability-limiting approach to the
problem. That is, a manufacturer is held responsible only for risks
that are foreseeable and is obligated to apply only such risk reduction
techniques as are reasonably knowable and otherwise commercially
feasible at the time of sale. 9 5 Despite the highly controversial nature
of this issue in recent years, the Third Restatement decisively limits
190. See KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note 5, at 419.
191. This language is from an early products liability reform statute, enacted in 1978. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1943, Reissue of 1989).
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRobucTs LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft
No. 1, Apr. 12, 1994).
193. The discussion of this topic in Tentative Draft No. 2, § 2 comment c, now provides in
part as follows:
How the defendant's design compares with other, competing designs is relevant to the
issue of whether the defendant's design is defective. Defendants often seek to defend their
product designs on the ground that the designs accord with the "state of the art." . .. This
Section states that a design is defective if the product could have been made safer by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design. If such a design could have been practically
adopted, the plaintiff establishes defect under § 2(b). When a defendant demonstrates that
its product design was the safest in use at the time of sale, it may be difficult for plaintiff to
prove that an alternative design could have been practically adopted. Defendant is thus
allowed to introduce in evidence proof with regard to industry practice that bears on
- whether an alternative design was practicable. While such proof is admissible into evidence,
it is not necessarily dispositive. If plaintiff introduces expert testimony to establish that a
reasonable alternative design could practically have been adopted, a trier of fact may con-
clude that the product was defective notwithstanding that such a design was not adopted by
any manufacturer, or even considered for commercial use, at the time of sale.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 2 cnt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995).
194. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. I (Tentative
Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995) (reproduced in part supra note 180). Comment a to § 2 also de-
scribes the general rationale:
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the responsibility of manufacturers in this important respect. In so
doing, the Third Restatement boldly stakes out a sound position on
state of the art that is consistent with both developing law' 9 6 and
moral theory 97 and which should help to put to rest the central theo-
retical debate in modern products liability law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even as the ALI presses were still churning out the new section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts three decades back, both
courts and commentators were drawn like moths inexorably to the
central mysteries of product defectiveness, to the burning flame of the
new doctrine proclaimed as "strict." Three decades since those heady
days have now rolled by, and the ALI's products liability presses have
cranked up once again. If there were a growth industry in Restate-
ment doctrine, section 402A of the Second Torts Restatement should
be there at the top, for "strict" products liability in tort has leap-
frogged in thirty years from a single section' 98 to its own Restatement.
With the approval of sections 1-3 of Tentative Draft No. 2 by the
ALI," the definitions of product defect which comprise the center-
piece of the new Products Liability Restatement are now in place.
The topic which over the years has involved the greatest confusion
and tumult in all of products liability law, and hence which is in great-
est need of "restatement," is the meaning of defectiveness and how it
For the liability system to be fair and efficient, most courts agree that the balancing of
risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must be done in light of the
knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of distri-
bution. To hold a manufacturer liable for a risk that was not foreseeable when the product
was marketed might foster increased manufacturer investment in safety. But such invest-
ment by definition would be a matter of guesswork. To insure against future claims, the
manufacturer would be required to estimate the risks upon which claims would be based. A
commercial insurer would be in no better position to make such an estimate. Thus, with
respect to unforeseeable or incalculable risks, manufacturers would find it inherently impos-
sible adequately to protect themselves with insurance. Furthermore, manufacturers may
persuasively ask to be judged by a normative behavior standard to which it is reasonably
possible for manufacturers to conform. For these reasons, §§ 2(b) and (c) speak of products
being defective only when risks were reasonably foreseeable.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUC-s LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar.
13, 1995); see also id. § 1 cmt. a (stating that "a defendant is held to the standard of knowledge
available to the relevant manufacturing community at the time the product was manufactured").
These principles apply with special force in connection with toxic chemicals and prescription
drugs. See i. §§ 2 cmt. 1, 8 ant. g.
196. Both judicial and legislative, because state of the art defenses have been a popular
reform measure in state legislatures. See KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY & GREEN, supra note
5, at 462. The Third Restatement properly takes the view that the plaintiff should have the
burden of proof on state of the art. "[P]laintiff should bear the burden of establishing that the
risk in question was known or should have been known to the relevant manufacturing commu-
nity." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No.
2, Mar. 13, 1995). The Third Restatement thus rejects the shift in the burden of proof on this
issue adopted by the New Jersey court in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
197. See supra note 188.
198. Even designated (perhaps distinguished) as an afterthought by the letter "A."
199. "Tentative" in theory, but largely cast in stone.
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relates to the law of negligence. At the very bottom of this most fun-
damental of all products liability issues is whether liability is truly
"strict" or whether it is really based on fault-whether it is pig or
mule.
The Third Restatement's formulation of the standard of liability
for manufacturing defects is only of passing interest, for it employs a
conventional definition-departure from intended design. Liability in
such cases thus is truly strict, in both fact and name. Few peeps of
discontent will be heard from either courts or commentators in this
noncontroversial formulation of existing law consistent with good
policy.
Far more interesting are the new "functional" definitions2" of lia-
bility for design and warnings cases. The Third Restatement here too
defines liability in terms of product defect, and it acquiesces in denot-
ing such liability "strict." Yet here there is a problem, for the rigidity
of the "strictness" concept is inconsistent with the considerations of
balance that lie at the heart of design and warning cases. This prob-
lem finds its source in the very origins of strict products liability in
tort, a doctrine that was cursed from its beginning by an inherent
schizophrenia arising out of its hybrid birth from separate tort and
contract law parents. 20 1 As courts and commentators have come to
recognize the inherent unworkability, illogic, and even incomprehensi-
bility of such a doctrine in design and warnings cases, the very idea
that liability in these central contexts is "strict" has been viewed in-
creasingly as a myth.
The Third Restatement could have exploded this myth of strict
liability in design and warnings cases, fully and explicitly, and it should
have done so. Such decisive action would have enhanced the author-
ity of the ALI and restored credibility to liability doctrines called
"strict" in various other tort law contexts. Instead, the Institute chose
to follow a hybrid (one might say bastardized) path that for at least
another generation institutionalizes liability rules that straddle the law
of torts and contracts and which do violence to conventional catego-
ries of tort law doctrine. Following the tortured path of many courts
in design and warnings cases, the Third Restatement pretends in black
letter that liability is strict but explains by comment that it is really
not. Strict liability, the ALI proclaims, now means negligence.
So defining strict liability in terms of negligence has two major
implications: one good, one bad. The first implication, the good one,
is that it effectively explodes the doctrine of strict products liability in
tort at its very core, in design and warnings defect cases. While the
200. This is the Reporters' characterization: "§§ I and 2 define the liability for each form of
defect in functional terms." RESTATEMENT (TiURD) OF TORTS: PRODUCS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 13, 1995).
201. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 1126 (describing the birth of strict products liability in
warranty as "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract").
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resulting demise of most "strict" products liability doctrine is some-
what muted, lying in the comments to the Third Restatement, its final
death knell is sounded there quite clearly, albeit indirectly. The issu-
ance of a formal death certificate for strict products liability has been
long in coming, and the muffled nature of the explosion will likely
restrain the jubilance or despair of those who care about such things.
But the core of strict products liability has exploded nonetheless.
The second implication of calling negligence liability "strict" has
a troubling side that tarnishes the result, for it locates at the core of
the Products Liability Restatement a fundamental disingenuity. An
important goal for any Restatement should be "to improve the law,
[to] seek wisdom and excellence in [the] choice of legal rules.""2 2 De-
fining strict liability as negligence-pigs as mules-hardly has the feel
of "wisdom and excellence." Because many courts struggling to make
sense of section 402A themselves have come to view the basis of lia-
bility in such cases as little more than negligence, one might argue that
the law may "properly" be restated in this manner.2 °3 But the juris-
prudence of products liability developed this central contradiction
largely because Dean Prosser overreached in formulating section
402A too broadly, defining the doctrine far beyond its proper borders.
The Third Restatement provided the ALI with an opportunity to cor-
rect this fundamental error of the Second Restatement and to pro-
claim the law forthrightly-by declaring that the concept of "strict
liability" applies properly only to manufacturing flaw cases, and that
negligence principles and negligence doctrine govern liability in design
and warnings cases. But it chose to tread a middle and muddled path,
the one the Institute had unwittingly thrust upon the courts in section
402A now one-third of a century ago. As the twenty-first century ap-
proaches, the ALI in bootstrap fashion has now perpetuated, at least
to some extent, the myth that products liability is strict. That pigs are
mules is now officially the law.
How the courts will receive the Third Restatement is difficult to
divine. For a variety of reasons, it takes little prescience or even inge-
nuity to predict that the Third Restatement will be unable to muster
the kind of quasi-religious fervor that spawned the widespread and
uncritical adoption of section 402A of the Second Restatement thirty
years ago. The times and law both have changed in such fundamental
202. Shapo, supra note 11, at 634.
203. Tension between the "is" and the "ought" may be traced to the beginnings of the ALI's
restatement enterprise. See Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories:
Wisconsin and the American Law Institute, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1, 17 n.60 (citing N.E.H. Hull,
Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW
& HIsT. REV. 55, 60-65 (1990)). Judge Abrahamson notes that the is/ought conflict is presently
manifest in the revision of § 402A of the new Products Liability Restatement. Id. at 22.
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ways2°4 that such a resounding judicial reception today seems entirely
outside the realm of reasonable foreseeability.
2°
Some courts may be expected to adopt the new liability defini-
tions unskeptically and verbatim, while others no doubt will choose to
define their own liability tests in ways they deem superior. Most
courts, of course, will need to decode section 2 in various respects.
Why the "defect" lily should be gilded linguistically with some other
standard based on "reason," or vice versa, is a perplexing problem
that the ALI inflicted years ago upon the legal community in section
402A's double-headed standard of "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous." Perhaps concluding that lawyers and judges have suf-
fered insufficiently, the ALI has done it once again-for now a prod-
uct must be "not reasonably safe" in order to be (perhaps in addition
to) "defective" in design or warnings. As a way around this problem,
courts may well choose to strip the definitions of all Hydra heads save
one. Probably many courts will decide to redefine the standards in
section 2, perhaps along lines suggested above, while others likely will
choose to return to accepted negligence doctrine in design and warn-
ings cases.2 °6
If. the purpose of the Third Restatement was to provide guidance
to courts and lawyers by clarifying 207 the confusing doctrine of prod-
uct defect, the project may be viewed as having failed-only partially
to be sure, but in a fundamental way. In view of the highly
politicized20 8 and controversial nature of the enterprise,20 9 the likeli-
hood of complete success of such an important and complex project
may have been doomed from the start; perhaps achievement of such
an ambitious goal was simply a political impossibility in an increas-
ingly disparate and divisive world.210 The Reporters certainly cannot
be faulted for lack of originality, for their "functional" manner of
204. And there is no dark and menacing citadel to storm, towering in the mists, nor is Dean
Prosser now available for muster to carry into battle a flag of destiny and virtue.
205. To coin a phrase.
206. As for the bulk of secondary defectiveness doctrine, the Third Restatement's Com-
ments and Reporters' Notes contain a wealth of information to assist courts and lawyers seeking
guidance on such issues.
207. See Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Re-
statement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. Louis L.J. 185, 192 (1968) (noting clarifica-
tion as one achievement of restatements).
208. Compare Shapo, supra note 11, at 698 (noting that "politicization of the common law of
torts is risky business, whether done by Congress or the American Law Institute") with Hans A.
Linde, Courts and Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 821, 840,
844 (1994) ("[T]he A.L.I. should not avoid controversial topics of legal policy, even if it could ...
[and] policymaking must be prepared to face politics.").
209. See, e.g., Attorneys Spar over Restatement (Third) of Torts; ATLA to Mobilize Opposi-
tion to ALl Project, 22 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 436 (Apr. 22, 1994); see also supra note
18 and accompanying text. But see Shapo, supra note 11, at 652 (theorizing that the controver-
sial nature of products liability law was itself a principal "motivating force" in the ALI's decision
to restate this part of tort law first).
210. It may even be that the very idea of attempting to "restate" the law of torts in any way
was misguided from the start. See Green, supra note 119, at 584.
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redefining product defect was a creative effort to quell the warring
factions in the ongoing debate over the proper formulation of this
area of the law. Yet, rather than clarifying the central defect notions,
the new Products Liability Restatement defines them in a manner that
is inscrutable, assuring years and maybe decades of continuing uncer-
tainty and debate. The myth of strict products liability has been ex-
ploded, but its ghost lives on to haunt the halls of justice and academia
for years to come.
